This article is based on ideas originally published by VoxEU – Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and has been independently rewritten and extended by The Economy editorial team. While inspired by the original analysis, the content presented here reflects a broader interpretation and additional commentary. The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of VoxEU or CEPR.
Trump Signs Stablecoin Legalization Bill China’s CBDC Adoption Permanently Prohibited U.S.-China Diverge in Strategy, Enter Full-Scale Currency Hegemony Rivalry
Last week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed major legislation related to digital assets, including a bill that entirely bans the issuance of a central bank digital currency (CBDC). This reflects President Trump’s policy direction. Since his presidential campaign last year, Trump has expressed concern that CBDCs could enable surveillance of financial activities by tracking the flow of money for individuals and companies. He has called for a restructuring of the digital asset system. With the passage of this legislation, the United States made it clear that it intends to strengthen stablecoins as an alternative to CBDCs and a means of maintaining dollar hegemony in the digital era.
On July 21 (local time), political circles reported that the House of Representatives passed three major bills during ‘Crypto Week’, which focused on digital asset discussions: the Stablecoin Regulation Act (GENIUS Act), the Digital Asset Market Structure Act (CLARITY Act), and the CBDC Ban Act (Anti-CBDC Act). Despite multiple delays due to opposition from hardline conservatives within the Republican Party, the bills passed with 308 votes in favor and 122 against. The following day, on the 18th, President Trump signed the so-called GENIUS Act at the White House.
Although the signature process for the Digital Asset Market Structure Act and the CBDC Ban Act remains pending, the passage of all three bills deliberated during Crypto Week is seen as resolving much of the regulatory uncertainty surrounding digital assets. As a result, investment sentiment toward major cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and related stocks such as Coinbase is expected to improve, potentially leading to increased capital inflows into the crypto market. On July 14, when legislative discussions intensified, Bitcoin hit an all-time high of $122,944 during intraday trading and is currently fluctuating between $118,000 and $120,000.
In addition to the legalization of stablecoins, another core principle of this Crypto Week was the total prohibition of CBDCs. The CBDC Ban Act prohibits the Federal Reserve from issuing, distributing, or operating a CBDC. CBDCs, as digital forms of central bank money, allow for real-time tracking of all financial flows and have raised concerns about being misused as tools for monitoring individual and corporate financial activity. While the Federal Reserve and other major institutions had conducted years of research on implementing a digital dollar system, this legislative decision effectively halts further discussion.
This shift in CBDC policy began in earnest with Trump’s inauguration. As a candidate, he labeled CBDCs as "government surveillance tools" and "threats to individual freedom," and voiced strong opposition. Shortly after taking office in January, he issued Executive Order 14178, titled “Strengthening American Leadership in Digital Financial Technology,” which banned all research, experimentation, issuance, and recommendations related to CBDCs. This effectively nullified Executive Order 14067, the Biden administration’s 2022 digital asset policy blueprint.
Following the GENIUS Act signing on July 18, President Trump stated during a White House briefing, “CBDCs are dangerous tools that allow the federal government to control citizens’ assets and transactions.” He added, “I have already banned CBDC issuance by executive order, and will soon codify this into law to permanently prohibit it.” He made clear that no future administration would be able to implement a CBDC. “All of this is to protect the American identity—freedom and democracy,” he said. “The United States will never infringe upon its people’s freedom, privacy, or economy with a centrally controlled digital currency.”
Some interpret this move as a strategic policy to expand demand for U.S. Treasury bonds. President Trump’s large-scale tax cut proposals could lead to increased budget deficits and bond issuance. However, the global capital markets are witnessing a ‘Sell America’ trend. A rare phenomenon is occurring in which the value of the dollar is falling despite rising U.S. Treasury yields. For example, when President Trump announced a 10% universal tariff and country-specific reciprocal tariffs in April, the 10-year Treasury yield rose from 4.13% to 4.41%, but the dollar index dropped by 4.15% during the same period.
In this context, the U.S. is formulating a strategy to nurture stablecoin issuers as new demand sources for Treasury bonds. Stablecoin issuers must hold reserves to maintain the coin’s value, and the U.S. government is guiding them to hold Treasuries instead of dollars. The GENIUS Act outlines reserve requirements including U.S. legal tender, central bank deposits, and U.S. Treasury securities with a remaining maturity of 93 days or less. Currently, the combined Treasury holdings of USDT and USDC—the two dominant stablecoins—total $126 billion.
Experts believe that by legalizing the stablecoin system and banning CBDC adoption, the United States is entering a full-fledged currency hegemony battle with China, which has already implemented a CBDC. Under the leadership of the People’s Bank of China, the country has been piloting one of the world’s most advanced digital yuan systems (DCEP). Starting in 2020 in major cities like Shenzhen, Suzhou, and Beijing, digital yuan payments are now possible in over 200 cities. The electronic wallet app “Digital Yuan (数字人民币)” has amassed hundreds of millions of users and is used in public sector salary payments, public transport, and online shopping.
Moreover, the Chinese government has made it clear that it views the digital yuan not merely as a payment method but as a tool to internationalize the yuan and solidify economic and financial dominance. During the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, digital yuan was offered to foreign participants as a payment option. In Hong Kong, the government has enabled the use of digital yuan without the need for a mainland bank account. Amid growing geopolitical tensions, de-dollarization trends are accelerating, and China is expanding yuan-based settlements in Asia, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries, and other emerging markets.
According to SWIFT, the yuan’s share in international payments stood at 2.2% as of July, still far behind the dollar’s 40%. However, if China continues to expand the use of the digital yuan among allied and trading partner countries, it could become a new driver of yuan internationalization. The U.S. is actively seeking to counter this trend. Media outlets such as The Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg have analyzed President Trump’s CBDC ban as a response to concerns that digital currencies could grow into "derivative weapons" challenging the global influence of the dollar.
Meanwhile, while the U.S. and China have launched a digital currency hegemony race, South Korea has yet to establish a clear direction. Although the Bank of Korea has been working to implement a CBDC, attention has shifted to the U.S. model following President Lee Jae-myung’s campaign pledge to issue stablecoins. However, Bank of Korea Governor Rhee Chang-yong has publicly voiced concerns over potential side effects of privately issued stablecoins. Cho Seung-rae, spokesperson for the National Planning Committee, also noted, “Many contentious issues remain, including the issuing entities, licensing methods, and international cooperation,” signaling a cautious stance.
Philly Shipyard Branding and Korea-U.S. Joint Construction Model
Accelerating Technology Transfer to Target the MRO Market
The Key to Future Growth: Long-Term Sustainability
Hanwha Ocean has secured an order for a liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier in the United States, signaling a decisive move into the country’s military ship maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) market, valued at up to USD 7.4 billion annually. By transplanting Korean shipbuilding technology into the American shipyard it acquired last year, Hanwha aims to boost competitiveness and pursue long-term project opportunities based on local infrastructure. While the Korean government is exploring comprehensive support measures, the success of this strategy will likely hinge on establishing trust in technology and fostering a robust local partnership ecosystem.
According to a regulatory filing on July 22, Hanwha Ocean signed a USD 250 million contract with Hanwha Philly Shipyard for the construction of one LNG carrier and secured an option for an additional vessel. Hanwha Group emphasized that this deal aligns with the U.S. government’s initiative to revitalize its shipbuilding and shipping industries and bolster energy security, particularly in light of the phased introduction of policies mandating the transport of U.S.-produced LNG beginning in 2029.
Under this agreement, Hanwha Philly Shipyard—now a Hanwha Ocean affiliate—will receive the order from Hanwha Ocean’s shipping unit and subcontract the construction back to Hanwha Ocean. Most of the actual shipbuilding will take place at Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje facility in Korea, while Philly Shipyard will support certification processes to meet U.S. Coast Guard regulations and maritime safety standards. Hanwha Ocean plans to use this collaborative construction model to expand its capacity to build LNG carriers for the U.S. market while gradually transferring Korea’s advanced shipbuilding technologies to Philly Shipyard.
Industry analysts see this contract as a convergence of Hanwha Ocean’s U.S. market entry strategy and Philly Shipyard’s restructuring efforts. Since its acquisition by Hanwha last year, Philly Shipyard—formerly Philly Shipyard, Inc.—has focused on securing commercial shipbuilding capabilities through major facility investments and modernization. Hanwha’s vision is to transform the shipyard into a “Korean-style” operation by transferring technology, retraining personnel, and digitizing production processes.
Hanwha Ocean’s success in securing a large-scale shipbuilding order in the U.S. also marks a significant step toward entering the naval MRO market. While the LNG carrier contract serves as a symbolic first move, forthcoming large-scale MRO projects are expected to be the real proving ground for profitability. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Navy spends between USD 6 billion and USD 7.4 billion annually on warship MRO services. Due to limitations in domestic shipbuilding infrastructure, a significant portion of these contracts is awarded to foreign or multinational firms.
Hanwha Ocean plans to leverage production and maintenance infrastructure at Philly Shipyard to bid on various U.S. Navy maintenance contracts. Simultaneously, by transferring shipbuilding technologies and operational know-how from its Korean headquarters, Hanwha aims to build technological credibility and enhance procurement efficiency. Industry observers describe this approach as a “technology-led maintenance package sales” strategy, predicting that Hanwha’s position in the North American market will strengthen if it secures long-term contracts with the U.S. Navy.
In fact, Hanwha Ocean has already begun upgrading Philly Shipyard’s design and production capabilities in tandem with the LNG carrier order. Aware of the lag in digital shipbuilding and high-speed construction systems among U.S. shipyards, Hanwha intends to transform Philly Shipyard into a “U.S.-style shipbuilding innovation model” by integrating Korea’s latest naval engineering technologies. This technology-driven investment strategy is seen as a blueprint for attracting high-value projects over the long term, beyond mere expansion of order volume.
Hanwha Ocean is also refining its long-term strategy to become a core supplier within the U.S. MRO ecosystem rather than focusing solely on short-term orders. One initiative includes forming an “MRO Cluster Council” with 15 small and medium-sized shipbuilding and maritime companies in the Indo-Pacific region. The council aims to establish a maintenance ecosystem centered on Hanwha Ocean by dividing responsibilities such as hull maintenance, parts supply, and system inspections. This shift from a fragmented outsourcing model to a collaborative network seeks to enhance both bidding competitiveness and operational efficiency.
The Korean government is also stepping in to support these efforts. For example, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy is considering expanding programs to help domestic companies obtain the U.S. Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC). The CMMC is a mandatory requirement for firms seeking contracts with the U.S. Department of Defense, making it an essential credential for naval maintenance contractors. The government aims to streamline the certification process, enabling both large shipbuilders and their smaller subcontractors to secure CMMC more easily and, ultimately, facilitating smoother access to MRO contracts.
Experts agree that long-term project acquisition is critical for meaningful success, beyond initial order wins. Given the structure of U.S. defense budget allocations, multi-year MRO contracts tied to sustained maintenance offer companies greater stability and profitability than single-project orders. This underscores the importance of forging long-term supply relationships based on technological competence and trust rather than competing solely on price.
Ultimately, the success of Hanwha Ocean’s U.S. MRO strategy will depend not only on the competitiveness of its shipyards but also on its ability to establish stable, collaborative networks with local partners. The MRO business demands a comprehensive set of capabilities—including shipbuilding and maintenance technology, cost efficiency, workforce management, supply chain systems, and regulatory compliance. Industry experts consistently emphasize that true leadership in this high-value sector can only be achieved when local production, maintenance, and support are seamlessly integrated—and when these efforts are backed by strategic government support.
China’s State-Owned Shipping Giant Acquires Stake in Spanish Port EU Commission’s Warnings Fail to Stop Chinese Capital Penetration Existing Global Shipping and Logistics Structure Undergoes Accelerated Shift
China is emerging as the central hub of the global supply chain. Since becoming a global manufacturing powerhouse, China has significantly expanded its port acquisitions and investments, a move that is now seen as reshaping shipping and logistics flows across Europe and the wider world.
According to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on the 21st (local time), China’s state-owned shipping firm COSCO SHIPPING (hereafter COSCO) recently secured a 51% stake in a terminal at the Port of Valencia, Spain. WSJ reported that as negotiations continue with global investor groups such as Hutchison and BlackRock over the sale of approximately 40 ports worldwide for about $23 billion, COSCO has proceeded with expanding its European port investments.
What stands out is that despite European countries expressing discomfort over Chinese maritime companies owning or investing in major ports, COSCO successfully acquired the stake. Countries like Belgium have labeled China a “potential adversary,” warning against the politicization and militarization of China’s civilian maritime sector.
Investments by Chinese firms in key maritime infrastructure across Europe remain a subject of major controversy. Back in 2022, the European Commission warned such deals could pose national security risks. Nonetheless, Germany approved the sale of a 24.9% stake in Hamburg’s largest container terminal to COSCO, drawing intense scrutiny. Proponents cited German corporate law, which grants no voting rights for stakes under 25%, but critics warned that repeated transactions of this nature could gradually mute Europe’s voice against China.
COSCO already holds partial or controlling stakes not only in Spain and Germany but also in ports such as Las Palmas in the Canary Islands and Rotterdam in the Netherlands. COSCO’s expansion into overseas ports did not happen overnight. It began with acquiring a stake in a container terminal in Antwerp, Belgium in 2004, and gained momentum in 2008 when it took over operations at the Port of Piraeus in Greece. The Piraeus port has since been transformed into a global logistics hub.
Another milestone was the acquisition of a 51% stake in Spain’s Valencia and Bilbao port operations in 2017 for approximately $216 million. COSCO referred to these ports as “strategic assets ideally suited for expanding its global terminal portfolio.” According to local port traffic statistics and the United Nations Shipping Connectivity Index, Valencia was the most connected port in the Mediterranean in the first quarter of 2025, scoring 610 points — a sharp rise since COSCO’s investment in 2017.
There have also been changes in container throughput. Since COSCO’s 2017 acquisition, Chinese container imports via Valencia have increased each year, while export volumes to China have remained flat or declined. Spain has effectively become one of the main EU gateways for direct Chinese imports that bypass the United States.
China’s port investments are part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2013, BRI was framed as a vision centered on trade rather than conquest. Xi declared China’s intention to build a network of thousands of miles of high-speed roads and railways (“Belt”) and maritime routes (“Road”) linking Asia, Europe, and Africa.
This idea aimed to revive the ancient Silk Road, with the ultimate strategic goal of securing and expanding a trade network that would cement China’s global position. The Chinese government has since launched massive investments in overseas port, rail, and logistics infrastructure. Europe ranks as the region with the highest investment intensity. In Spain’s case, increased maritime transport with China has also led to a surge in exports of new products like electric vehicles.
The expansion of overseas bases by Chinese shipping and port firms is not limited to Europe. In 2013, the state-owned China Merchants Group acquired a 49% stake in Terminal Link for approximately $432 million. As a result, Chinese capital is now present in over 129 ports across Europe, North America, South America, Asia, and Africa.
Industry experts note that more than half of the world’s maritime container transport is handled by just ten companies, including COSCO, Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM. Chinese players like COSCO are competing directly with these global shipping giants for strategic footholds. A representative from Valencia Port said, “As the number of COSCO container vessels calling at the port increases, container throughput reached 5.47 million TEUs in 2024.” During the same period, the Port of Piraeus handled 4.22 million TEUs.
The Wall Street Journal commented, “Europe is a core continent for China’s trade and diplomatic expansion strategy, and the Chinese government is rapidly accelerating its investments in port hubs.” Experts also noted that “China’s acquisition of key port stakes is gradually reshaping the global shipping and logistics structure.”
Expanding Its Global Payment Presence
Building Real-World Transaction Networks with Stablecoins
“We Must Distinguish Technological Progress from Practical Reality”
The cryptocurrency Ripple (XRP) is rapidly expanding its ecosystem as it positions itself as an alternative to the traditional global payment network, SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), in the international remittance market. With Ripple accelerating its push to establish a real-world transaction base through the issuance of its own stablecoin, some observers are predicting that Ripple could either replace SWIFT or coexist alongside it as a parallel system. However, prevailing sentiment in the market suggests that a full-scale transition in the near term is unlikely, given SWIFT’s entrenched global financial infrastructure, its deep-rooted credibility, and the complex regulatory environments across different countries.
As of July 21 (local time), data from cryptocurrency platform CoinMarketCap showed Ripple’s market capitalization at approximately USD 31 billion, ranking it seventh among all cryptocurrencies, with a 24-hour trading volume exceeding USD 1 billion. Ripple has expanded its payment network through partnerships with traditional financial institutions, setting itself apart from typical cryptocurrencies by positioning itself as a practical payment infrastructure. This strategy—distinct from the speculative nature of many past cryptocurrencies—has fueled expectations that Ripple could emerge as a mainstream payment option.
Ripple aims to resolve the inefficiencies of the current SWIFT-based international remittance system by positioning itself as a digital asset capable of real-time settlement and payments. With a vision to enable cross-border transfers without the involvement of central banks or intermediary institutions, Ripple hopes to introduce a new dynamic to the global financial market. Currently, Ripple operates remittance services based on its RippleNet network in countries such as Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and the Philippines, and has forged partnerships with several banks. As these technological efforts to bypass the traditional closed infrastructure of the financial sector yield tangible results, Ripple is increasingly being recognized as a viable real-world payment solution.
Strategic moves by Ripple’s issuing entity, Ripple Labs, have also been a key driver of its expansion. Ripple Labs is working to build a payment network that can interoperate with central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), expanding its collaboration channels with international organizations and governments. One example is its pilot project with the Royal Monetary Authority of Bhutan, which seeks to link the country’s CBDC to a payment network based on XRP. At the same time, Ripple Labs is enhancing technical compatibility by expanding its open-source initiatives and bolstering its legal advisory capacity to navigate financial regulations. This multifaceted approach is playing a critical role in elevating Ripple from a mere cryptocurrency to a “trusted payment infrastructure.”
According to market research firm TokenPost, the global remittance market targeted by Ripple is estimated at USD 21 trillion. The firm projected that even capturing a 5% share of this market could multiply Ripple’s market capitalization several times over. The launch of Ripple’s institutional payment solution, the Ripple Liquidity Hub, is seen as a signal that the company is making a serious bid to penetrate the market. Analysts also note that maintaining a stable circulation volume of XRP helps reduce volatility risks, reinforcing Ripple’s strategy.
As Ripple’s influence within global payment networks continues to grow, speculation has emerged over its potential to replace the SWIFT system. According to Blockmedia, “Ripple is seeking to transform existing international remittance networks by leveraging its proprietary stablecoin, RLUSD,” adding that “the conclusion of Ripple’s long-standing legal battle with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has paved the way for the company to expand its footprint within the regulated financial system.” Just as SWIFT once served as a backbone of the global financial network, Ripple is now drawing attention as a digital-era alternative payment infrastructure.
RLUSD, a dollar-pegged stablecoin, has garnered market interest thanks to its low price volatility and structure optimized for international transactions. Ripple has built a test network designed to process cross-border payments between countries outside the United States in real time using RLUSD, and real-world applications of the coin are gradually expanding in regions such as Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. In these markets—where financial infrastructure remains underdeveloped—Ripple aims to position RLUSD as a practical solution that simplifies procedures, reduces fees, and enables real-time settlement, thereby addressing some of the inefficiencies of the SWIFT-based system.
Brad Garlinghouse, CEO of Ripple Labs, has also highlighted that Ripple’s RLUSD-centered remittance solution is faster and more efficient than traditional systems, stating, “We will work with legacy financial institutions to establish a new global financial standard.” While he stopped short of explicitly declaring a bid to replace SWIFT, his remarks are widely seen as part of a broader strategy aimed at competing with the existing financial infrastructure. As a result, the full-scale deployment of RLUSD is expected to serve as a critical proving ground for Ripple’s ecosystem expansion and a launchpad for strengthening its presence in the ongoing contest for global financial dominance.
Despite Ripple’s ongoing expansion, the prevailing view in the market is that it would be difficult for Ripple to replace the existing SWIFT network in the short term. SWIFT operates the world’s largest financial messaging system, connecting over 10,000 financial institutions in more than 200 countries. Its infrastructure has undergone repeated regulatory coordination and stability checks at the international level. In contrast, while Ripple touts its technological strengths and fast transaction speeds, many believe it still lags behind in terms of global trust and regulatory acceptance.
Moreover, Ripple’s system would have to meet a complex set of requirements—including inter-central bank cooperation, monetary policy execution, and anti-money laundering compliance—which presents significant barriers to competing directly with the established system. Whereas financial regulators prioritize SWIFT’s security and standardization, Ripple focuses on technological innovation, making their underlying structures fundamentally different. This disparity highlights the fact that Ripple remains unproven when it comes to multi-layered functions such as foreign exchange management and risk mitigation, beyond simple remittance services.
Additionally, Ripple Labs’ global rollout strategy for RLUSD is still largely considered experimental. Although pilot tests are underway with select partner banks, the stablecoin’s full-scale distribution remains limited in regulatory-heavy markets like North America and Europe. Since the inclusion of RLUSD in any remittance network would require explicit regulatory approval, expanding it into a practical payment infrastructure will necessitate close cooperation with national governments.
Given these factors, many analysts believe Ripple is more likely to pursue a path of complementing or operating alongside existing infrastructure rather than attempting a wholesale replacement of SWIFT. In practice, Ripple has been gradually expanding its partnerships with traditional financial institutions and applying its remittance solutions in real-world transactions—making a dual-operation model the most realistic short-term scenario. Such a hybrid approach could serve not just as a transitional phase but as a practical bridgehead for shifting the global payments system, especially when considering structural constraints like varying national regulations and disparate financial infrastructures.
Taiwan maintains strict anti-dumping duties on stainless steel from China and South Korea. South Korea may follow suit as pressure mounts to defend domestic producers. Japan's shift toward inflation and pricing controls adds complexity to regional steel policy.
A new fault line is emerging in Northeast Asia’s economic landscape, not in politics, but in the realm of stainless steel. Countries long known for cautious economic diplomacy are adopting more aggressive trade protection measures, drawing invisible walls across markets once heralded for their integration. The once-muted rivalries among Asian powerhouses are heating up in the form of tariffs, quotas, and duties. As these nations aim to protect their industries from global overcapacity and underpriced imports, the region inches toward economic fragmentation.
For Taiwan, the battle has been ongoing for more than a decade. In March, the Taiwanese government reaffirmed its commitment to protecting local producers by extending anti-dumping duties on stainless steel imports from China and South Korea for an additional five years. With tariffs reaching up to 38.11% for Chinese steel and 37.65% for South Korean steel, it sends a strong message that the island nation is not willing to yield to low-cost foreign suppliers.
These duties are not symbolic. For over a decade, they have been integral to Taiwan’s strategy to preserve its domestic steel industry. The idea that Chinese steel could be rerouted and falsely labeled as Taiwanese, thereby circumventing duties imposed by other countries, has been circulating in international circles. However, given Taiwan's consistent application of tariffs, this scenario appears increasingly unlikely. China and Taiwan may be politically entangled, but in terms of trade, especially steel, they operate under separate policies and competitive interests.
The message from Taipei is clear: Taiwan’s industrial backbone will not be sacrificed to predatory pricing. With global demand for steel fluctuating and prices often determined more by policy than market fundamentals, Taiwan’s long-term consistency in maintaining trade barriers could provide it with strategic stability amid the shifting tides of regional commerce.
South Korea, another regional giant in steel production, is feeling the pressure. With Taiwan’s move fresh in the region’s trade memory, Seoul is now weighing whether to reinforce its own defenses. According to sources within the Korean Economic Daily, the government is considering reactivating or expanding anti-dumping duties on steel imports, a move largely driven by lobbying from local steel producers.
This is not surprising. The steel industry is both strategically important and politically sensitive. As countries like China continue to produce massive volumes of low-cost steel, neighbors with smaller markets are left with a stark choice: import and undercut domestic industries, or raise barriers and risk retaliatory trade blows. Taiwan chose the latter. South Korea may not be far behind.
If Taiwan and South Korea are seasoned veterans in steel protectionism, Japan is the latecomer to the arena. Yet, its recent moves speak volumes. While Tokyo hasn’t matched Taiwan or South Korea in imposing steep anti-dumping tariffs, Japan’s domestic economic signals show that it may be leaning closer to their playbook.
Japan’s latest inflation report revealed that core prices have increased by 3.7% year-over-year, the highest rate in nearly two years. The jump is partly due to rising energy and food costs, but industrial inputs, including metals, are also to blame. While Japan hasn’t explicitly imposed broad tariffs, it is shifting toward more domestic sourcing and price control measures, potentially opening the door to more assertive trade actions in the future.
For years, Japan has refrained from the tit-for-tat trade policies that marked relations between China, Taiwan, and South Korea. This restraint may be ending. If Tokyo follows suit, either through direct tariffs or indirect industrial protections, the entire Northeast Asian region could witness an unprecedented thickening of economic borders. Once open trade lanes could become bottlenecks of bureaucracy and policy friction.
What we’re witnessing is not just a series of isolated trade decisions. It’s a regional recalibration. Northeast Asia’s steel powers are shifting from open-market optimism to strategic protectionism. Whether driven by inflation, overcapacity, or political undercurrents, the outcome is the same: higher walls, fewer bridges.
As Japan cautiously joins Taiwan and Korea in the era of economic defense, the once-fluid trade of steel across Asia’s industrial corridor may give way to an era marked by fragmentation and fierce competition. The era of shared growth may be waning, giving way to one of survival and sovereignty.
Podgorica and Tivat airport concessions at stake Defeats European contenders such as CAAP and TAV-ADP consortium If finalized, secures up to 30-year operating rights
Incheon International Airport Corporation (IIAC) has been selected as the preferred bidder for the airport operation rights in Montenegro, located in the Balkan Peninsula of Europe. This marks the first time a Korean airport operator has outperformed European competitors in mainland Europe. The successful bid positions Korea's airport export initiative on the brink of securing operating rights for two European airports, but controversies surrounding the bid process's transparency, internal discord, and potential legal disputes suggest the final confirmation may encounter significant hurdles.
On July 21, IIAC announced that it had ranked first in the bidding for Montenegro’s “Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Project for Development and Operation of Two Airports” involving facility expansion, operations, and maintenance. The PPP model entails private entities investing initial capital and managing development and operations for a certain period to generate returns. Public institutions participating via equity investment earn operational profits, while construction firms gain overseas contracts, making it a win-win strategy.
The project covers the operation of Podgorica Airport, the capital’s airport, and Tivat Airport, a major tourist destination on the Adriatic coast of Montenegro, for a period of 30 years. It is considered a critical infrastructure initiative in anticipation of Montenegro’s accession to the European Union (EU).
IIAC distinguished itself from competitors that focused on large-scale upfront investments and real estate-driven development by presenting an optimal investment strategy grounded in operational efficiency and long-term profitability. Key elements of IIAC’s proposal included a rational construction schedule, implementation of a “Quick Win” passenger service quality program, balanced attraction of low-cost and full-service carriers, adaptation to market shifts post-Russia–Ukraine war, and sustained profitability of commercial facilities.
IIAC plans to invest a total of $72 million across Podgorica Airport, which served 1.8 million passengers last year, and Tivat Airport, which handled 1.3 million passengers. In partnership with the Korea Overseas Infrastructure and Urban Development Corporation (KIND), IIAC will establish a special purpose vehicle (SPV) locally, aiming to finalize a contract with the Montenegrin government by year-end. The SPV will be owned 50.1% by IIAC and 49.9% by KIND.
Montenegro officially launched the PPP bidding process for Podgorica and Tivat Airports in 2019, as the nation aims to join the EU by 2028 and requires robust gateway airport infrastructure. IIAC formed a consortium this January with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Serbia, and KIND, entering the international bidding process in May. The Korean government and KIND spearheaded the "K-Airport Export" strategy, with Korea Development Bank and Korea Eximbank providing financial support, while KOTRA's Belgrade trade office handled local intelligence gathering.
Countries participating in the Montenegro airport bid included Korea, India, Luxembourg, France, and Türkiye. In early May, India withdrew, and France and Türkiye formed a joint consortium, resulting in a three-way competition. However, on May 10, despite being qualified, the France-Türkiye consortium—Aéroports de Paris-TAV—also withdrew, leaving IIAC and Luxembourg’s Corporacion America Airports SA (CAAP) as the final contenders.
Although industry expectations leaned toward IIAC, which boasts world-class operational expertise, the company faced a potential disqualification despite receiving high technical scores in June. At the time, the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), acting as consultant, awarded IIAC’s technical proposal a score of 95 out of 100. However, Montenegro’s bid committee gave it only 79.7—below the 80-point threshold. CAAP received 80 points from IFC and 85 from the bid committee.
According to Montenegro’s local media outlet Vijesti, some bid committee members gave IIAC zero points for certain technical items such as runway and terminal expansion. A government source commented, “IFC consultants and the committee evaluated the same proposal very differently. The consultants gave near-perfect scores, but the same bidder was disqualified based on certain committee members’ ratings.”
As the controversy intensified in Montenegro, IFC questioned the evaluation criteria and requested a reassessment. Earlier this month, the committee conducted a second evaluation. IIAC scored 81.69, while CAAP scored 88.72, and the committee formally adopted the new results. Although committee chairman Niko Deljoša objected—arguing that the first evaluation, which was not officially adopted, should be included in the documentation—most members disagreed.
According to the published financial bid documents, IIAC and CAAP submitted different strategies. IIAC proposed a fixed fee of $100 million and a variable fee of 35% of annual revenue. CAAP offered a slightly higher fixed fee of $101 million but only 17% as a variable fee. While IIAC’s fixed fee was $1 million lower, its revenue-sharing rate was 18 percentage points higher, signaling strong confidence in long-term profitability.
Following the reassessment, IIAC secured a final composite score of 96.18, far ahead of CAAP’s 65.18, marking a major step toward contract award. However, severe internal discord within the bid committee and the possibility of CAAP filing an appeal suggest the final confirmation may face prolonged turbulence. Some committee members suspect that Chairman Deljoša’s actions are laying legal grounds for CAAP’s appeal. He was reportedly admonished for saying he “consulted a lawyer” during a meeting, which was criticized as “illegal conduct,” and subsequently left the room or claimed “someone falsified documents,” vowing to submit a dissenting opinion.
CAAP is also reportedly preparing an appeal, claiming external influence tainted the committee’s decision-making process. According to Vijesti, the committee must submit all documentation to the Ministry of Transport by the end of this month. Once the ministry publishes the notice, bidding firms will have 15 days to review and file appeals. If an appeal is submitted, the government’s concession committee must review it within 30 days, which could delay the final decision until September.
OpenAI is turning ChatGPT into a full-service commercial and civic platform. By internalizing e-commerce and funding nonprofits, it’s building its own AI ecosystem. Profit, power, and public trust now converge at a single, expanding hub: OpenAI.
SAN FRANCISCO. OpenAI, the trailblazing force behind ChatGPT, is entering a defining chapter in its evolution, not only as an AI research lab but as a full-fledged commercial and civic ecosystem. In recent days, the company has made two distinct yet deeply connected announcements: the rollout of a new AI agent model capable of controlling web browsers and software tools, and the launch of a USD 50 million fund aimed at building AI capacity among nonprofits and communities. On the surface, one speaks to profit, the other to purpose. But together, they signal a singular ambition: to consolidate OpenAI’s reach across both economic and societal dimensions.
The first move, perhaps the more disruptive from a business perspective, is OpenAI’s shift to internalizing e-commerce transactions via its new agent-powered interface. This advanced assistant, now embedded in ChatGPT for Pro and Teams users, can do more than generate text or analyze spreadsheets. It can shop. It can be booked. It can act. With that capability, OpenAI has begun cutting ties with traditional third-party shopping affiliates, opting instead to take a direct cut from sales executed within its platform.
This strategic pivot fundamentally alters the value proposition of ChatGPT. What was once a tool for conversation or research is now an economic conduit, one where the interface doesn’t just recommend a product, but completes the purchase in-browser, through a semi-autonomous agent acting on the user’s behalf. OpenAI, in turn, secures a portion of each transaction.
"It's the Apple model, but for generative AI," said one analyst familiar with OpenAI’s financial roadmap. "They’re bringing commerce into their walled garden, not unlike how Apple internalized music sales through iTunes or apps through the App Store."
This internalization reflects a larger trend in tech: minimizing reliance on external ecosystems and maximizing profit capture by keeping the value chain in-house. The implications are substantial. Retailers may need to recalibrate their advertising strategies, while competitors in the AI space must now rethink how they monetize similar capabilities. Regulators could also begin asking more complex questions about monopolistic behavior in digital commerce.
The agent model also deepens OpenAI’s role not just as a creator of tools, but as a creator of infrastructure. With the assistant’s ability to browse the web, manipulate files, and execute transactions, OpenAI has leaped into what some insiders call "total platformization." Users won’t just visit ChatGPT for a response; they’ll live inside it for their workflows, errands, and information needs.
It’s no longer far-fetched to imagine a near-future scenario where ChatGPT manages your calendar, books travel, files documents, and negotiates contracts. With every such function pulled inward, OpenAI owns a greater share of the customer journey and a larger share of the economic upside.
In effect, OpenAI is building an operating system for life.
Parallel to its commercial expansion, OpenAI is now taking steps to strengthen its social foundations. The launch of a USD 50 million fund to support nonprofit and community-based organizations, particularly in education, healthcare, economic opportunity, and ethical research, is both a goodwill gesture and a strategic investment.
The company frames it as part of its broader mission to ensure AI benefits all of humanity. But make no mistake: this fund is also laying the groundwork for an OpenAI-centric civic ecosystem. As more nonprofits adopt and adapt OpenAI’s tools, they become part of its extended network, comprising users, contributors, validators, and advocates.
The fund comes on the heels of an extensive engagement process led by OpenAI’s Nonprofit Commission, which consulted over 500 organizations representing more than 7 million people. These consultations, company executives say, informed the shape of the fund and its priority areas.
"We don’t just want to build technology," one OpenAI official noted during the fund’s launch. "We want to build trust, and that means listening to the communities who will live with these systems."
But trust isn’t the only currency being exchanged. Influence is. As OpenAI becomes embedded in educational curricula, public service platforms, and localized research efforts, it positions itself as an indispensable partner, not just to tech users but to society at large.
Viewed together, the agent model and the nonprofit fund paint a coherent picture: OpenAI is internalizing its ecosystem, both economically and socially. The assistant becomes the front-end of commerce. The fund becomes the outreach arm to civil society. And in both cases, the goal is clear: deepen integration, reduce external dependency, and concentrate value.
It’s a playbook that mirrors other platform giants. Google did it with search and ads. Amazon did it with logistics and cloud. Meta did it with social infrastructure. But what sets OpenAI apart is the speed and breadth of the integration. In less than two years, ChatGPT has evolved from novelty to necessity and is now a platform.
Critics worry this consolidation may lead to reduced competition, opaque monetization practices, and an AI landscape shaped more by private incentives than public interest. Supporters argue that centralization can lead to improved safety controls, a more cohesive user experience, and the ability to scale responsibly.
Both views may prove true.
As OpenAI continues to push technological, economic, and civic boundaries, it faces a fundamental challenge: balancing its nonprofit origins with its commercial future. The creation of a dual structure (with both a capped-profit and nonprofit arm) was always an ambitious bet. Now, as the assistant takes center stage in monetization and the fund builds its grassroots base, the tension between mission and margin becomes more pronounced.
Will OpenAI succeed in being both a profit engine and a public steward? Can it scale without crowding out smaller innovators or creating dependencies that limit user choice? Will its new civic partnerships maintain autonomy, or simply reinforce the gravitational pull of the platform?
These are questions that will define the next era of AI governance, and OpenAI’s answer will shape not only its future but the trajectory of artificial intelligence worldwide.
One thing is sure: in 2025, OpenAI will no longer just be a maker of language models. It is becoming the infrastructure of modern life, and the stakes have never been higher.
RFK Jr. halts U.S. funding to Gavi, triggering global health concern. Critics argue that his vaccine views lack a scientific foundation. The world braces for ripple effects as immunization efforts falter.
In a stunning policy reversal, President Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has ended federal support for Gavi, the international vaccine alliance that has protected millions of children in vulnerable nations. Citing concerns over transparency and billionaire influence, Kennedy argues the move reclaims U.S. autonomy in global health spending. But critics warn the decision could cripple immunization efforts in low-income countries and embolden anti-science rhetoric at home. The clash is now a test not just of budget priorities, but of how the United States defines its global health responsibility.
In an era marked by political upheaval and institutional skepticism, Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has emerged as a lightning rod for controversy, particularly in the realm of public health. Long known for his critiques of vaccines and pharmaceutical corporations, RFK Jr. has taken a bold step: cutting off all U.S. federal funding to Gavi, the global vaccine alliance.
To his base, this is a principled stand against what he views as an unaccountable, profit-driven biomedical regime. “Why are we funding an organization that operates more like a corporate arm than a health mission?” RFK Jr. recently asked in a press appearance. He portrays the move as a necessary disruption, one meant to restore transparency and public trust in global health decisions.
Yet, the consequences of this policy extend far beyond U.S. borders. Gavi is a linchpin in international vaccination efforts, having helped inoculate over a billion children since its inception. It has supported campaigns against measles, polio, yellow fever, and other vaccine-preventable diseases in over 70 countries.
RFK Jr.’s decision, then, is not just domestic policy; it’s a global health event.
One of the core pillars of RFK Jr.'s argument is that Gavi has lost its neutrality. He suggests the organization operates under undue influence from billionaire philanthropists, especially Bill Gates. The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is Gavi’s most prominent private donor, and Gates himself has shaped global vaccine priorities for nearly two decades.
For RFK Jr., this level of influence crosses ethical lines. “No single individual, however wealthy, should dictate global health strategy,” a Kennedy campaign adviser said.
It’s a view that resonates with a growing contingent of Americans skeptical of large foundations and foreign aid. Among critics, the public-private partnership model that Gavi operates under is seen as structurally flawed, too beholden to elite agendas, and lacking democratic oversight.
But public health experts argue this view is dangerously narrow. Gavi isn’t just Gates; it’s a coalition involving WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank, and dozens of national governments. Its work is supported by robust evidence showing dramatic reductions in child mortality and disease burden in some of the world’s poorest regions.
Removing U.S. funding, which has been one of Gavi’s top contributors, doesn’t just create a gap; it also threatens the alliance’s operational stability. Already, Gavi and its partners are warning of vaccine delays, program disruptions, and potential resurgence of deadly diseases.
Beyond policy, RFK Jr.’s stance strikes at the heart of the vaccine debate. His long-held views on immunization safety, widely discredited by mainstream scientists, raise concerns not only about health funding but also how science is communicated and trusted in the modern age.
RFK Jr. has questioned everything from the number of vaccines in childhood schedules to the rigor of vaccine safety trials. However, he has provided little in the way of peer-reviewed evidence to support his more controversial claims. For many scientists, this isn’t healthy skepticism; it’s science denial.
What makes this moment particularly alarming to public health officials is that RFK Jr. is no longer just talking; he’s governing. And now, with real policy power, his vaccine views are shaping decisions that directly impact vulnerable populations.
In low-income countries where vaccine-preventable disease remains a leading cause of death, the stakes couldn’t be higher. Medical Teams International recently warned that Gavi supply disruptions could lead to millions of children missing basic immunizations, increasing the risk of deadly outbreaks.
Meanwhile, Kennedy’s domestic supporters remain largely unmoved by global criticism. Many argue that the U.S. has spent too long funding initiatives abroad while neglecting structural issues at home. They want reallocation, not recommitment.
Yet the ripple effects of this decision may soon reach back to U.S. shores. Global health is not a zero-sum game; epidemics that start abroad often end up on America’s doorstep. Weakening immunization infrastructure globally increases risks of pandemics, something the world is still recovering from.
Samsung’s slimmer Galaxy Z Fold 7 surprises with better battery life. Market response signals a shift toward premium foldables, especially in Korea. A rebranding could redefine Samsung’s place in the high-end smartphone world.
Samsung is no stranger to innovation, but its latest iteration of foldable smartphones may be its most pivotal yet. The Galaxy Z Fold 7 introduces a sleeker form factor without compromising performance, battery life, or appeal. Early user reviews and market data indicate that consumers are starting to view foldables as more than just a gimmick; they're the future of premium devices. With that future in sight, Samsung is laying the groundwork for a bold new brand identity.
Samsung’s Galaxy Z Fold 7 has emerged as a quietly disruptive force in the smartphone world. With a slimmer body than ever, early expectations pegged its battery life as a likely weak point. Instead, the Z Fold 7 manages to outperform its predecessor, outlasting both the Fold 6 and Flip 6 in several benchmarks.
Design-wise, the Fold 7 is a leap toward portability without compromising power. Consumers often worry that thinner devices trade battery capacity for style, but Samsung’s engineering team seems to have struck an elegant balance. This iteration may well become the blueprint for future foldables.
The impact of this redesign goes beyond power efficiency. By merging practicality with a premium feel, Samsung positions itself not only as a foldable innovator but also as a potential market leader capable of outpacing lower-cost Chinese competitors. Foldables are no longer niche. They are starting to feel mainstream, especially when they start borrowing the sensibilities of iPhones in sleekness and weight.
This year marks a turning point: the Fold 7 is outselling the Flip in Korea for the first time. It’s a signal not just of design success, but of a psychological shift in consumer mindset. Foldables are no longer seen as quirky gadgets for early adopters. They are now entering the public consciousness as serious flagship devices.
In South Korea, Samsung’s home turf, the local response has been especially telling. The Fold 7’s performance, aesthetics, and the practicality of its form factor appear to resonate with users across age groups. Younger consumers who may have once dismissed the Fold as bulky or impractical are now embracing it as stylish and functional.
This uptake could also reshape global perceptions. Korean market reactions often mirror broader trends in Asia, and Fold 7’s performance suggests a growing preference for foldables over traditional bar phones. It could also push Apple to reconsider how long it can delay entering the foldable market.
With the Fold 7 gaining traction as an actual premium device, Samsung is revisiting an old idea: creating a new brand entirely for its high-end models. The company has long struggled to differentiate its most innovative phones from the rest of the Galaxy lineup. Now, backed by market enthusiasm for the Fold 7, a rebranding opportunity seems ripe.
The difference isn’t just about specs, it’s about experience. Consumers who use the Fold 7 don’t feel like they’re using a Galaxy in the traditional sense. It’s a different form, a different lifestyle, and, perhaps, a different identity.
Industry watchers speculate that Samsung could unveil a new sub-brand as early as next year, designed exclusively for foldables and ultra-premium innovations. This could help distinguish it from the mainstream Galaxy models and elevate its brand equity in markets traditionally dominated by Apple.
The timing couldn’t be better. The slim, efficient Fold 7 proves that foldables are ready for the big leagues, not just as tech demos, but as everyday premium smartphones. With public opinion and performance now aligned, Samsung may finally have what it needs to redefine the smartphone market in its image.
