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Iran Squeezes Oil Routes by Sea and Land as Trump Presses Ahead With ‘Stranglehold Campaign’ Despite Midterm Risks

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Siobhán Delaney
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Siobhán Delaney is a Dublin-based writer for The Economy, focusing on culture, education, and international affairs. With a background in media and communication from University College Dublin, she contributes to cross-regional coverage and translation-based commentary. Her work emphasizes clarity and balance, especially in contexts shaped by cultural difference and policy translation.

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Iran Targets Transport Networks to Weaken U.S. Blockade
Trump Sticks to Hard Line Despite Midterm Risks
Global Energy-Market Turmoil Persists Amid Uncompromising Standoff

As retaliatory exchanges between the United States and Iran intensify, the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for global crude shipments, has once again ground to a virtual halt. A drone attack has also disabled Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which the kingdom had relied on as a contingency route in the event of a blockade of the strait, placing Gulf oil producers’ alternative export strategies in jeopardy. Iran appears intent on disrupting maritime and overland transport networks simultaneously to blunt the effectiveness of the U.S. blockade while amplifying calls for Washington to compromise among countries unable to withstand prolonged energy-supply disruptions. In response, U.S. President Donald Trump appears determined to maintain sanctions and military pressure even at the risk of Republican losses in the midterm elections this November.

Vessel Struck in the Strait of Hormuz

According to Reuters on the 13th (local time; all subsequent dates are local), the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which operates under the British Royal Navy, said it had received a report that a projectile had struck a vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz. A fire broke out aboard the vessel, and local authorities evacuated its crew. Details about the ship, the extent of the damage and the perpetrator were not immediately available. Iranian state media also reported that day that a merchant vessel had been attacked off Iran’s southern coast, leaving one person dead and three injured. It was not immediately clear, however, whether this was the same incident reported by the UKMTO.

Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has contracted sharply in recent weeks as maritime clashes between the United States and Iran have intensified. Iran claimed that it had attacked 10 vessels near the strait in retaliation for the United States sinking five Iranian oil tankers. According to shipping intelligence provider Kpler, seven vessels passed through the strait on the 10th, fewer than half the average of 15 recorded over the preceding 10 days. Compared with the roughly 125 vessels that traversed the waterway each day before the Iran war, the strait’s transit function has effectively collapsed. Although the U.S. Navy is escorting some merchant vessels, shipping companies continue to avoid the route and war-risk insurance premiums continue to rise as the threat of attack persists.

Drone Strike Hits Hormuz Bypass, Imperiling Saudi Oil Shipments

The vessel strike came shortly after Saudi Arabia temporarily shut down its East-West Pipeline as a precaution following a drone attack on the 12th. President Trump raised the possibility that Iran was behind the pipeline attack. Saudi authorities said several drones launched from Iraq had attacked pipeline facilities in the Riyadh and Medina regions, causing casualties and equipment damage. The Iraqi government also confirmed that the drones had been launched from the southern province of Maysan, formed an investigative committee and dismissed the military commander responsible for the area. Although authorities in both countries have yet to formally identify the perpetrator, Iran-aligned Shia militias deeply embedded in Iraq’s political and security apparatus have emerged as the leading suspects, intensifying pressure on the Iraqi government to rein in the groups involved.

The 1,200-kilometer pipeline, which crosses the Arabian Peninsula from east to west, connects Abqaiq on the Persian Gulf coast with the Red Sea port of Yanbu. It has a daily transport capacity of approximately 5 million barrels, and Saudi Arabia had redirected roughly 4 million barrels of crude per day through the route over the past six months to offset disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The volume represents approximately 4% of global crude supply. With the pipeline now out of service, however, Yanbu is estimated to have only five to seven days’ worth of crude inventories available for export. Saudi Arabia can cover the shortfall for several days using crude stored at Egypt’s Ain Sokhna and Sidi Kerir ports, but an extended pipeline closure would rapidly deplete those reserves. With Saudi crude production having already plunged from 10.9 million barrels per day in February to 6.2 million barrels per day in August, the paralysis of its export corridor is expected to exacerbate the global supply shortage and intensify upward pressure on oil prices.

Table 1. Gulf Oil Producers’ Alternative Transport Networks Around Hormuz and Their Limitations

CategoryAlternative Transport NetworkKey Figures and PlansLimitations
United Arab Emirates (UAE)Abu Dhabi oil fields→Fujairah export terminal on the Gulf of OmanAdditional bypass capacity scheduled to enter service in mid-2027Time and cost burdens associated with pipeline construction; military exposure of pumping stations, storage facilities and export terminals
Saudi ArabiaEast-West Pipeline→Red Sea port of YanbuAlternative shipments disrupted by precautionary closure following attackDirect voyages to Asia require passage through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, threatened by Iran-backed Houthi rebels
Long-Distance Alternative RouteYanbu→Egypt’s SUMED Pipeline and the Mediterranean→Cape of Good HopeTransit time approximately one month longer than existing routeHigher transport costs and successive bottlenecks across pipelines and the Red Sea
Gulf States OverallCombined use of pipelines, overland transport and ship-to-ship transfersAlternative capacity of approximately 10 million barrels per day, equivalent to half of prewar Hormuz transit volumesOil production and trade volumes expected to recover to prewar levels in the second quarter of 2027
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), international media reports

Gulf States Expand Bypass Pipelines but Face Capacity Shortfalls and Attack Risks

The attack on the East-West Pipeline has also disrupted the calculations of Gulf oil producers racing to expand overland transport networks and reduce their reliance on Hormuz. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) operates a pipeline connecting Abu Dhabi’s oil fields with the Fujairah export terminal on the Gulf of Oman and plans to bring additional bypass capacity online in mid-2027. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that even with the combined use of pipelines, overland transport and ship-to-ship transfers, most Middle Eastern crude production and trade volumes will not recover to their pre-Iran-war levels until the second quarter of 2027. Pipelines take years and vast sums to construct, while pumping stations, storage facilities and export terminals remain exposed as fixed targets, raising concerns that the military risks avoided in the strait could simply migrate to inland transport networks.

Transport capacity is likewise insufficient to absorb the volumes previously carried by sea. Approximately 20 million barrels of crude passed through the Strait of Hormuz each day before the Iran war, but Dr. Gordon Gray, a Gulf and Arabian Peninsula expert at George Washington University, estimates that the Gulf states can secure alternative transport capacity equal to only half that volume. Moreover, vessels sailing directly from Yanbu to Asia must pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where they face threats from Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Avoiding that route by traversing Egypt’s SUMED Pipeline and the Mediterranean before rounding the Cape of Good Hope would add roughly one month to the journey. As crude diverted from Hormuz must pass through successive new bottlenecks in pipelines and the Red Sea, the Gulf states’ alternative-route strategy is increasingly becoming a trade-off that entails both higher costs and greater military exposure.

U.S.-Iran Hostilities Resume One Month After Last Strike on Iranian Territory

The renewed escalation of instability across the Middle East’s oil transport network was triggered by the resumption of direct hostilities between the United States and Iran on the 30th of last month. U.S. forces struck two launch sites on Iran’s Larak Island at the southern end of the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. military said it had detected signs that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was preparing to launch rockets capable of laying mines in the strait. It marked the first U.S. strike on Iranian territory in roughly a month, since late July. After announcing that several military personnel and civilians had been killed or injured, Iran launched ballistic missiles at U.S. forces stationed in Jordan. President Trump had previously declared that all mines in the international waters of Hormuz had been removed and warned that any Iranian vessel attempting to lay new mines would be destroyed immediately.

Following the Larak Island strike, reciprocal attacks escalated into a series of strikes targeting warships and oil tankers. After the IRGC launched ballistic missiles at two U.S. Navy vessels on the 5th, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) struck three oil tankers, including vessels near Kharg Island, Iran’s principal crude export hub. Iran then attacked three oil tankers and three U.S.-linked vessels on the grounds that they had used routes not approved by Tehran. On the 8th, the U.S. military destroyed five Iranian oil tankers in retaliation for an additional missile attack targeting U.S. warships. Iran said it had responded by attacking two U.S. vessels and eight oil tankers and launching ballistic missiles at a U.S. military base in Jordan. Civilian casualties also occurred during the exchanges, with one crew member killed and another reported missing. The United States announced that it would destroy Iranian oil tankers whenever its vessels were attacked, while Iran countered that ships using unauthorized routes would be treated as targets.

Trump Embraces Prolonged Pressure Despite Risk of Midterm Defeat

As the cycle of retaliation alternated between attacks on warships and oil tankers, President Trump effectively abandoned his earlier timetable for a swift end to the war. On the 9th, he predicted that the Iran war would end immediately after the November 3 midterm elections, claiming that “Iran cannot hold out much longer and is desperately trying to influence the election.” Speaking to reporters in Ireland on the 13th, he reiterated that “it could end before the midterms, but it will end after the election.” The stance marks a significant departure from his pledge at the outset of the war to conclude it within weeks. It suggests that even if Iran is eager for an agreement, Washington will not rush into negotiations unless terms favorable to the United States are secured.

The White House currently believes that Iran intends to hold out until the midterm elections, using elevated oil prices and war fatigue in the United States as leverage. After disruptions to Hormuz transit pushed Brent crude above $100 per barrel, U.S. gasoline prices surged to $4.22 per gallon and diesel prices to $5.94. President Trump’s approval rating has fallen to its lowest level since he took office as inflationary pressures mount. Combined with the historical tendency for the president’s party to lose seats in U.S. midterm elections, the conditions are unfavorable for Republicans. Even so, President Trump appears to believe that lowering negotiating demands in response to electoral considerations would give Iran a misleading sense that its strategy had succeeded. His choice, therefore, is to maintain the blockade and military pressure until Iran’s calculations collapse, even at the risk of losing his party’s congressional majority.

Trump Links Pressure Over Hormuz to Iran’s Nuclear Program

President Trump’s repeated remarks about the Strait of Hormuz further reinforce his hard-line stance. On the 15th of last month, he said, “Once the job of defeating Iran is complete, we will declare the Strait of Hormuz U.S. territory.” He subsequently posted a map labeling the strait as “new U.S. territory” three times on his social media platform, Truth Social, and on the 2nd raised the possibility of renaming it the “TRUMP STRAIT.” He clarified several hours later that he had been “just throwing it out there,” but his repeated posting of the same map makes it difficult to dismiss the possibility that he intends to establish U.S. control over the waterway as a fait accompli. More recently, he warned that “Iran will be hit hard if it acts recklessly,” citing signs of activity at Pickaxe Mountain, an underground complex near the Natanz nuclear facility. The strategy is designed to pressure Iran into concessions by linking control of Hormuz with the nuclear issue.

The Trump administration’s refusal to accept Iran’s demands is rooted in concerns over U.S. credibility abroad. Washington calculates that retreating from Hormuz would heighten anxiety among Middle Eastern allies such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE while undermining U.S. deterrence in its strategic competition with China and Russia. Iran, by contrast, maintains that it can guarantee the safety of the strait only if the United States lifts its port blockade and eases sanctions on Iranian oil exports. Its strategy is understood as an attempt to prolong energy-supply disruptions and induce Gulf oil producers and Asian importers to press Washington for a compromise. Yet President Trump cannot easily retreat, because lowering U.S. demands under pressure from third countries would mean that Iran’s tactics had succeeded. As both sides wait for the other to suffer economic and political exhaustion, disruption across the oil transport network is likely to persist, while the contest over the Strait of Hormuz increasingly appears set to continue beyond the midterm elections.

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Member for

1 year 1 month
Real name
Siobhán Delaney
Bio
[email protected]

Siobhán Delaney is a Dublin-based writer for The Economy, focusing on culture, education, and international affairs. With a background in media and communication from University College Dublin, she contributes to cross-regional coverage and translation-based commentary. Her work emphasizes clarity and balance, especially in contexts shaped by cultural difference and policy translation.