AI can extend healthy life while eroding the job security that pays for it A small group gains from AI, while others lose both work and access to care Sharing AI's health gains requires sharing its productivity gains too

Europe can benefit from foreign AI without capturing an equal share of its rents Fiscal resilience requires compute, capital, ownership and local industrial capability The viable strategy is high adoption with minimum technological sovereignty

AI does not create a separate and measurable tax base Europe should tax economic rents and shifted profits, not AI use A layered tax framework can protect revenue without discouraging adoption

Data-centre hosts should recover identifiable local costs Server location cannot reveal where all AI rents arise Facility charges and wider profit allocation require separate rules

AI can raise productivity without causing broad job losses Fiscal outcomes depend on who captures the gains Tax bases weaken when income moves from wages to mobile or deferred returns

Warsh’s first FOMC resisted the expected political script Fed independence is proven through decisions, not appointments The real test comes when policy and politics collide A 12-0 vote can say more than many months o

AI tools accelerate code generation more than final software delivery Coordination and quality control now limit AI coding productivity Better models will create value only when firms redesign the delivery process New resea

AI can weaken the local tax base. Bond yields reveal that fiscal risk Policy must track local value, not AI adoption Research context

AI growth is becoming a major test for energy systems Regulation must track power use, grid pressure, and clean-energy claims AI can expand responsibly only if its energy costs are transparent and fairly managed If AI energy

AI adoption is high, but value is still unclear Value-Maxxing judges AI by outcomes, not usage Good AI use needs context, friction, and human judgment The most significant figure to emerge from the AI discussion isn’t the size of the mo

AI will reshape work before replacing it Big transitions are always slow and uneven Policy must manage partial automation early Every major technology shift begins with a promise of replacement and, for many years,

AI will replace human labor only when it becomes cheaper, reliable, and easier to manage than people The next 3–4 years will bring selective task automation, not mass job replacement The main risk is not total unemployment, but weaker entry-level career paths and greater pressure on workers

AI shifts costs more than it cuts them Speed gains often hide rework and risk Firms should use AI to support expertise, not replace it It is an easy mistake to make in the AI economy to conflate quicker output with

AI labor is not yet a simple low-cost replacement for human labor. The real cost lies in compute, infrastructure, energy, oversight and unreliable pricing Firms should compare AI and human labor task by task before replacing workers <

Keith Lee*

Korea faces an energy shock, not an imminent semiconductor blackout Oil dependence matters, but Korea’s power grid is stronger than alarmist headlines suggest The real lesson is to upgrade energy resilience, not confuse vulnerability with collapse

AI is raising output while reducing the need for average human labor Mass retraining alone will not solve a labor market that needs fewer workers Education policy must shift from teaching adaptation to protecting human economic relevanc

AI lets a select cadre of super-human workers outproduce whole teams. Visa barriers in the United States choke the frontier talent pipeline. Policy must back elite training, open immigration, and an automation-funded safety net.

Taiwan defence readiness now depends more on political unity than on rising military budgets Institutional paralysis weakens deterrence and makes allied support less certain Without bipartisan reform, Taiwan defence readiness will remain fragile in the face of China

China’s slowdown reflects a long process of rebuilding capital after a debt-driven boom The shift from property to technology will be slow and uneven Durable growth now depends on repair, reform, and smarter capital use China’s bo