“We Do Not Want War”: Putin Reaches Out to Europe as Troop Shortages and Deteriorating Finances Test Russia’s Ability to Sustain the War

“No winners if the situation deteriorates”: Putin signals willingness to restore ties while warning against military confrontation with Europe
Prolonged Ukraine war hampers Russian recruitment, with military pay delays also under consideration
Surging defense spending and national debt add to fiscal pressures, clouding Russia’s ability to sustain the war

Russian President Vladimir Putin said Russia was prepared for war with Europe but did not want an actual military confrontation. He warned that there would be no winners if tensions between Russia and Europe escalated. International observers see the risks arising from the prolonged war in Ukraine as a factor behind his remarks. With Russia facing a growing burden in sustaining the war, including defense spending, analysts say Putin is keeping the door open to negotiations while maintaining a hard-line message toward Europe in search of a breakthrough.

Putin’s Approach to Europe

According to Russia’s state-run TASS news agency, Reuters and other outlets on the 29th of last month (all dates hereafter are local time), President Putin raised the possibility of restoring relations with European countries at a press conference following the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow that day. “We support all measures to restore full relations with European countries,” he said, indicating that he was open to bilateral dialogue with individual countries as well as multilateral consultations at the European Union (EU) level.

Addressing rising military tensions with Europe, Putin said, “We are prepared, but we do not want war with Europe,” warning, “If anyone wants war, they should prepare.” He added, “The West has failed to achieve its goal of inflicting a strategic defeat on Russia, and it will be difficult to accomplish that even by 2030,” and cautioned, “Do not forget that if the situation deteriorates too far, there will be no winners.” On security in the Baltic Sea, he also said, “We do not want a situation like that in the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz to unfold in the Baltic Sea,” while stressing that Russia would “respond to any challenge.”

An Opening for Europe–Russia Dialogue

Putin’s remarks came shortly after rare direct contact with European leaders. On the 27th of last month, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a three-way telephone call with Putin lasting about 90 minutes, discussing ways to end the war in Ukraine and resume peace negotiations. The move contrasted with the reluctance of many Western European leaders to engage directly with Putin since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Stubb and Støre explained that they arranged the call to convey the need to end the war ahead of working-level trilateral talks among the United States, Russia and Ukraine scheduled for early this month in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE). “We share borders with Russia, and the outcome of this war directly affects the security of both our countries and Europe as a whole,” Stubb said, stressing that “direct dialogue is necessary to end the war.” Støre also said he had conveyed the need to ease military tensions, noting, “The war is causing enormous human and material losses, and the effects of the suffering and destruction will endure for generations.” Both leaders, however, made clear that the contact did not represent Europe as a whole and that their existing policies of support for Ukraine remained unchanged.

Securing Additional Troops Becomes Harder

Russia’s opening for dialogue with Europe is seen as reflecting the burden of the prolonged war in Ukraine. Russia has recently faced difficulties even at the recruitment stage. According to a Financial Times (FT) report in August, the Russian presidential administration and Defense Ministry set this year’s contract soldier recruitment target at 409,000, assigning quotas to regional governments. The plan was to replenish troop numbers by offering lump-sum payments of up to RUB 4.5 million rather than issuing another mobilization order, after the mobilization of about 300,000 reservists in September 2022 triggered a mass exodus abroad and social unrest. According to Ukrainian intelligence authorities, however, only about 195,000 contract soldiers had actually been recruited by early July, falling short of the target of 204,500 for that point in the year. Average daily recruitment also declined to 1,070–1,090, down from about 1,200 in 2024–2025.

Accounts of coercive recruitment practices by Russian authorities have also continued to emerge. The FT reported confirmed cases in Penza in southern Russia in which police raided workplaces or detained men on the street, took them to military recruitment offices and pressured them to sign contracts. In Ulyanovsk, even a man who had lost sight in one eye reportedly signed a military service contract. Regional governments and police are also expanding their recruitment pool by obtaining personal information on vulnerable people, including debtors, people under investigation and recently discharged conscripts, and visiting their homes and workplaces. In some regions, students have reportedly been induced to enlist without properly understanding the terms of their contracts.

Pay Delays for Military Personnel Not Involved in the War

Pay for existing military personnel is also placing considerable pressure on the Russian government. On the 30th of last month, independent Russian news outlet Verstka reported that “the Russian Defense Ministry has drafted an amendment to an order that would postpone this December’s pay for military personnel not directly involved in the Ukraine war until January next year.” Under current regulations, Russian troops receive the previous month’s pay between the 10th and 20th of each month, with an exception allowing December pay to be received by the 25th of that same month. Under the proposed amendment, December pay would be issued between January 11 and 21 of the following year.

Units deployed to the Ukrainian front would be exempt and would continue receiving pay on the existing schedule, while separate rules governing December bonuses for contract soldiers would also remain in place. Verstka noted that the Russian military had paid December salaries before the end of the year for 18 years, since at least 2008, and that the amendment would end this practice for the first time if implemented. The Russian Defense Ministry did not specify the reasons for changing the payment schedule. Some observers, however, interpret the move as an attempt to reduce immediate fiscal pressures by shifting some personnel costs into the next fiscal year as defense spending accumulates amid the prolonged war.

Table 1. Russia’s Growing Fiscal Burden

Persistent Deficits Raise Fiscal Alarm

These assessments have emerged as the Russian government’s fiscal position has recently deteriorated sharply. According to Russian Finance Ministry data, Russia’s federal government deficit this year is projected to widen substantially from the initially expected RUB 3.786 trillion to RUB 7.3449 trillion. The projected deficit-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio has also risen from 1.6% to 3.2%. Falling oil and natural gas tax revenue and rising war-related spending are cited as the main causes of the widening deficit. The Russian government lowered its forecast for this year’s oil and gas tax revenue from RUB 8.9 trillion to RUB 7.5844 trillion. To offset the decline, it has moved to expand tax revenue from non-energy sectors, including by raising the value-added tax rate from 20% to 22% in January.

These revenues, however, have not been sufficient to keep pace with the war-driven increase in spending. According to the draft budget submitted by the Russian government, defense spending in 2027 will total RUB 17.1474 trillion, 41.5% more than the RUB 12.121 trillion allocated in the existing 2026 budget, and account for 35.2% of total federal government spending. Including the RUB 4.2866 trillion budget for national security and law enforcement, these two categories alone would receive about 44% of the total budget. National debt is also rising rapidly. The Russian government’s debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to rise from 14.4% in 2024 to 19.9% at the end of this year and 21.7% at the end of 2027, with total debt estimated to reach about RUB 54 trillion in 2027. Related debt servicing costs, including interest on government bonds, are also projected to increase roughly 5.8-fold, from RUB 784 billion in 2020 to RUB 4.5701 trillion in 2027, accounting for 9.4% of total federal government spending.