“From Military Secrets to Advanced Technology”: Major Nations Tighten Security Against China-Linked Intelligence Gathering and Technology Leaks

UK’s MI5 publicly identifies China’s CGTRI, urging universities and research institutions to end cooperation
Repeated China-linked intelligence-gathering attempts, with confirmed cases of leaks and recruitment across countries
Tighter research-security rules across major nations, from disclosure of foreign funding and institutional ties to scrutiny of joint research

British intelligence authorities have urged universities to end academic cooperation with a research institute they identified as linked to China’s intelligence service. Efforts to strengthen research security are spreading, particularly across Western countries, amid mounting concerns that China could use joint research and talent exchanges to gain access to other nations’ advanced technologies and classified information. Indeed, the United States, the United Kingdom and South Korea have confirmed a succession of China-linked intelligence-gathering and technology-leak cases targeting military secrets and advanced research materials.

Warning from British Intelligence Authorities

In a statement on September 30, local time, Britain’s domestic intelligence service MI5 publicly identified the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI) as an institution closely linked to China’s Ministry of State Security. MI5 said CGTRI’s “primary purpose is to fund academic research that directly enhances the Ministry of State Security’s technical capabilities for espionage,” explaining that “CGTRI is part of a major Chinese state-owned conglomerate, and its ties to the Ministry of State Security had previously remained concealed.” More than 100 UK-linked academics were found to have participated in projects supported by CGTRI.

MI5 advised universities and research institutions to immediately review ongoing or planned collaboration with CGTRI and verify the ultimate source of their research funding. It also warned that institutions and individuals continuing research ultimately funded by CGTRI after the alert should seek independent legal advice and could face prosecution under Sections 3 and 17 of the UK’s National Security Act 2023. British Security Minister Dan Jarvis said the alert “exposes attempts by Chinese intelligence services to covertly exploit our academics’ expertise and research to undermine the national security of the United Kingdom and its allies.”

Joint Action by the Five Eyes Alliance

Britain had previously warned of such risks of classified information being compromised through the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, which also includes the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In June, the Five Eyes said Chinese military intelligence agencies were using professional networking sites such as LinkedIn and online recruitment platforms to recruit people capable of supplying sensitive information. Primary targets included government and military personnel and security-clearance holders, but the campaign also targeted people working in defense, diplomacy and intelligence, as well as academics, journalists and think-tank personnel with indirect access to government information.

Chinese operatives reportedly posed as representatives of overseas private consultancies, think tanks and recruitment firms, posting vacancies for foreign-policy and defense analysts and screening applicants’ résumés to assess their access to sensitive information. They then conducted video interviews and requested trial reports on topics such as China’s foreign relations, Indo-Pacific security and international trade. Once a relationship had been established, they moved communications to encrypted messaging services and gradually began requesting nonpublic government and military information. After the Five Eyes issued the warning, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) seized 13 website domains suspected of being used in Chinese intelligence-gathering operations. The US Department of Justice determined that the websites were associated with fictitious consulting firms established to collect sensitive information from current and former US government and military personnel and were operated through individuals linked to Chinese intelligence agencies.

Risks Across South Korean Institutions

South Korea has also seen a Chinese national receive a prison sentence for attempting to obtain military secrets under instructions from a Chinese intelligence organization. In July, the Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling sentencing a man identified by his surname, Qing, to five years in prison and ordering the forfeiture of approximately $3,367 for violating the Military Secret Protection Act. Qing entered South Korea under instructions from “Ken Jake,” an espionage organization belonging to the intelligence bureau of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Joint Staff Department, and contacted an investigator from South Korea’s Defense Counterintelligence Command who was posing as an active-duty service member. Ken Jake operatives impersonated military researchers and others in military-related KakaoTalk open chat rooms, seeking to purchase Level II and Level III military secrets concerning South Korea–US joint exercises, US forces, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and operational plans. Qing was arrested in March last year after repeatedly meeting the undercover investigator on Jeju Island to deliver operational funds and security equipment.

Criminal cases involving the disclosure of advanced research materials have also emerged at universities. A prominent example involved autonomous-driving technology at the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). A former professor in KAIST’s School of Electrical Engineering, identified as A, joined China’s Thousand Talents Plan, a program designed to recruit highly skilled overseas talent, and signed a contract with Chongqing University of Technology. The professor was indicted for allowing researchers at the Chinese university to access and use 72 files containing research materials on light detection and ranging (LIDAR) developed by KAIST researchers between 2017 and 2020. Investigators found that the professor had received approximately $643,624 from the Chinese government in salary, relocation assistance and other payments. In May 2024, the Supreme Court upheld a two-year prison sentence for violations including breaches of the Industrial Technology Protection Act.

Cases of graduate students transferring research materials overseas have also been confirmed. A Vietnamese graduate student researching “bidirectional onboard charger” technology to improve electric-vehicle charging efficiency at a university in Seoul uploaded research materials and technical drawings to the cloud in 2023, then abruptly withdrew from the university and left the country. The foundational technology had received approximately $588,456 in research and development funding from the Ministry of Science and ICT and was being developed jointly with Hyundai Motor Group. Investigators subsequently confirmed that the research materials had been transferred overseas, and the student was sentenced to two years in prison by a trial court in December last year.

Table 1. Major China-Linked Intelligence and Technology-Leak Cases

Recruitment Reaching Harvard Faculty

Concerns over research security are also growing in US academia, following cases in which China used financial incentives to recruit prominent scholars. Charles Lieber, then chair of Harvard University’s Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology and widely regarded as a leading nanoscientist, was arrested by the FBI in January 2020 for allegedly failing to properly disclose his ties to the Thousand Talents Plan and Wuhan University of Technology (WUT) to the US government. According to an FBI affidavit, Lieber signed a contract proposed by WUT in 2011 and participated in China’s overseas talent recruitment program. China appointed Lieber as a strategic scientist at WUT, requiring him to formulate research strategies, mentor Chinese researchers, undertake key projects and expand international collaboration. In return, Lieber was promised substantial compensation, including a monthly salary, living expenses, research funding and airfare.

Lieber subsequently helped establish the “WUT–Harvard Joint Nano Key Laboratory” with WUT and pursued arrangements allowing Chinese researchers to conduct research at Harvard. Harvard, however, did not learn of the joint laboratory until 2015 and raised concerns that its name and logo had been used without official university approval. When Department of Defense investigators asked about his research collaboration with China in 2018, Lieber responded that he had never been asked to participate in the Thousand Talents Plan. He also denied having a formal relationship with WUT when the National Institutes of Health (NIH) examined those ties that same year. The FBI, however, concluded that these statements were false based on emails, contracts and payment records. Lieber was ultimately indicted on charges including concealing his ties to China and the compensation he received, and making false statements to federal authorities.

Continued Efforts to Strengthen Research Security

As concerns over the transfer of confidential information to China intensify, major nations are strengthening institutional safeguards for research institutions and universities. In the United States, National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33), issued in January 2021, established research-security standards for federally funded research. NSPM-33 requires researchers to disclose positions held at foreign institutions, overseas research funding and participation in foreign government-sponsored talent recruitment programs in a more consistent manner. It also requires institutions receiving substantial federal research funding to establish dedicated research-security programs. The United States subsequently reinforced this regulatory framework through the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. In addition, the National Science Foundation (NSF) currently requires researchers seeking funding to certify that they do not participate in “malign foreign talent recruitment programs” from countries of concern, including China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, and requires certain foreign financial support to be reported at the institutional level. Research institutions must retain documentation concerning foreign appointments, employment relationships and foreign research funding and submit it upon request by the NSF.

The European Union (EU) is moving in a similar direction. In May 2024, the Council of the EU adopted a recommendation on enhancing research security, identifying the unwanted transfer of critical technologies, undue foreign influence and violations of research ethics as major risks. It recommended that member states, universities and research institutions examine overseas research partners and funding sources and establish their own risk-assessment and due-diligence procedures for international collaboration. Individual countries are also steadily tightening their rules. Britain reviews overseas joint research in sensitive fields such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies and advanced materials through its Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT), while the Netherlands is pursuing the introduction of advance security screening for researchers and students working with sensitive technologies. Since 2024, Canada has also restricted federal research funding for researchers affiliated with government-designated organizations of concern in designated sensitive technology fields, including AI, quantum technologies and semiconductors.