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Steelmakers in Liquidation, Shipyards in Financial Trouble: Clouds Gather Over Royal Navy Rebuilding

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Anne-Marie Nicholson
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Anne-Marie Nicholson is a fearless reporter covering international markets and global economic shifts. With a background in international relations, she provides a nuanced perspective on trade policies, foreign investments, and macroeconomic developments. Quick-witted and always on the move, she delivers hard-hitting stories that connect the dots in an ever-changing global economy.

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Steel plate supplier’s cash crisis casts uncertainty over support ship procurement
Disrupted shipyard investment adds to difficulties securing new vessels
Restoring production capacity becomes a priority for closing capability gaps

The Royal Navy’s rearmament plans have been hampered by weaknesses in the steel supply chain and financial difficulties at shipbuilders. With Liberty Steel’s Dalzell plant, which is to supply steel plate for new support ships, struggling for cash, other steel affiliates in the same group have also entered liquidation one after another. Investment disruptions and design changes are increasing pressure on shipbuilding operations, while the navy faces capability shortages as aging vessels are retired before their replacements enter service. For the UK government, which is seeking to increase defense spending, restoring the industrial base needed to build and repair warships has become an urgent priority.

Dalzell Plant Falls Behind on Wages, Putting Steel Plate Supply at Risk

According to the British daily The Guardian on the 16th (all dates hereafter are local time), the supply of 34,000 tonnes of domestically produced steel plate for three new Royal Navy support ships is at risk of disruption. Liberty Steel’s Dalzell plant in Motherwell, Scotland, which is responsible for the deliveries, is so short of cash that it has been unable to pay operating expenses and wages on time. The vessels are Fleet Solid Support (FSS) ships that will supply ammunition and food to aircraft carrier groups and other vessels at sea, with construction overseen by the UK subsidiary of Spanish state-owned shipbuilder Navantia. Measuring 216 meters long and displacing 39,000 tonnes, they will be key supply assets supporting the Royal Navy’s long-range, extended operations. The UK government has encouraged greater use of domestically produced steel in their construction, but the supplier’s deteriorating finances have increased procurement uncertainty.

Dalzell’s cash crisis began when financing dried up for its parent company, GFG Alliance. Affiliates of GFG, led by Sanjeev Gupta, have faced financial pressure since their main lender, Greensill Capital, collapsed in 2021, and production at Dalzell has also been constrained over the past two years. The funding shortage has affected wages, with payments delayed twice in recent months, including at the end of last month. Workers’ concerns have deepened after workplace pension provider Aviva notified them that it could no longer accept additional contributions. Even the site’s security contractor reportedly withdrew over unpaid bills, disrupting outside services needed to operate the plant.

Liberty Steel’s UK Affiliates Enter Liquidation in Succession

As GFG’s financial difficulties have dragged on, its steel affiliates have also faced liquidation one after another after failing to repay debts. UK specialty steel subsidiary Specialty Steel UK (SSUK) was ordered into compulsory liquidation by London’s High Court on August 21 last year. The company produced steel for aerospace, defense and power generation and employed about 1,450 people at the time. In accepting creditors’ winding-up petition, the court took a negative view of its prospects for recovery. Liberty objected, saying it had proposed a plan to attract new investment, but control of the company passed to the government’s official receiver and specialist administrator Teneo. Suppliers owed payment for goods or services also began registering as creditors in the liquidation proceedings to recover their money.

The search for a new owner remained difficult after liquidation. The UK government agreed to fund SSUK’s operating costs while a buyer was sought, but negotiations over a private-sector acquisition made little progress. Ultimately, in September, it concluded that it could not support the proposed private-sector takeover and announced plans for a public-sector acquisition. More than 1,300 jobs remained at the company at the time, and the government’s stated objectives included protecting employment and establishing a long-term operating plan for the production facilities. However, it committed only to pursuing an acquisition using existing budgets following due diligence, leaving the purchase price and operating plans for individual sites undecided.

While the government was discussing how to handle SSUK, Liberty Steel Newport, a Liberty Steel affiliate in Wales, also entered liquidation. Creditor Siemens Financial Services pursued winding-up action in July and again in October, and the Newport company entered creditors’ voluntary liquidation on the 13th of last month. After years without production, the plant had finally reached the stage of winding up its assets and liabilities. Management failings were also apparent in its handling of financial information. According to steel industry publication Kallanish, the last accounts filed covered the period ending in March 2019, and the company had missed financial statement filing deadlines since 2021. With a prolonged production shutdown compounded by a lack of financial information, joint liquidators took charge of winding up the company.

Table 1. Liquidation Status of Liberty Steel Affiliates

CategorySpecialty Steel UK (SSUK)Liberty Steel Newport
Liquidation proceedingsCompulsory liquidation ordered by London’s High Court on August 21 last yearCreditors’ voluntary liquidation began on the 13th of last month
Business conditionsProduces steel for aerospace, defense and power generation
Employed approximately 1,450 people at the time of compulsory liquidation
Production suspended for several years
Last filed accounts covered the period ending in March 2019
Financial statement filing deadlines missed since 2021
Responsible administratorsGovernment’s official receiver and specialist administrator TeneoJoint liquidators
Acquisition and winding-up plansGovernment funding for operating costs
Public-sector acquisition plan announced in September after private-sector takeover talks stalled
Siemens Financial Services pursued winding-up action
Winding up of the idle plant’s assets and liabilities began
Next stepsProtect more than 1,300 jobs and establish a long-term operating plan
Pursue acquisition using existing budgets following due diligence
Purchase price and operating plans for individual sites remain undecided
Notice to submit details of claims by the 19th
Verify outstanding debts and proceed with liquidation
Impact on suppliersRegistration as creditors to recover unpaid bills for goods and servicesProcedures to recover outstanding payments through submission of creditor claims
Sources: UK government (GOV.UK), Companies House, The Gazette and others

Loss of Control Over Australian Steelworks and Unpaid Equipment Bills in South Korea

Failures to secure working capital at overseas production sites have also led local governments and administrators to intervene in management. A prominent example is the Whyalla steelworks in Australia, formerly owned by Liberty Steel’s parent, GFG Alliance. In February last year, the South Australian government placed the steelworks’ operator, OneSteel, into administration and appointed KordaMentha as administrator. At the time, OneSteel owed tens of millions of AUD to the state government, suppliers and others, and GFG lost management control when the company entered administration. The steelworks and associated mines are now being sold while the federal and state governments provide operating funds to support payment of workers’ wages and supplier bills. Having narrowed the field to two prospective buyers this year, the Australian government has asked them to submit final financing plans.

Alongside operating difficulties at existing steelworks, payment for the acquisition of production equipment has also been delayed. In November 2022, Liberty Steel signed a contract to acquire electric arc furnace and hot-rolling equipment from KG Steel’s Dangjin plant for a base contract price of USD 68 million. The acquisition covered two 160-tonne electric arc furnaces, a continuous caster and hot-rolling equipment. At the time, Liberty outlined plans to relocate the equipment to its Galați steelworks in Romania to establish a low-carbon electric arc furnace production system. The aim was to reduce investment costs by using existing equipment and shorten the time needed to transition to electric arc furnaces. However, payment for the equipment remained unsettled even four years after the contract was signed. By September last year, KG Steel had received a total of USD 66.9 million in deposits and installment payments, while the payment schedule for the remaining USD 1.1 million was extended several times this year. A revised disclosure on September 30 again pushed back the expected date for receiving the balance, from the end of September to November 30.

Weak UK Shipbuilding Capacity Hampers Rearmament

These steelmakers’ production difficulties and investment disruptions reflect weaknesses in the industrial base that the UK needs to expand for rearmament. In written evidence submitted to Parliament, the Society of Maritime Industries (SMI) noted that suppliers of specialty steel, castings and forgings for naval shipbuilding were limited, with some products dependent on overseas companies. It also identified shortages of skilled workers in ship design, marine engineering and welding as constraints on increasing output. In particular, SMI stressed that because many small and medium-sized suppliers depend on irregular orders from a handful of defense customers, long-term orders and reliable payments must be guaranteed to support investment in equipment and recruitment. Its point was that delivery delays would be difficult to resolve if additional defense spending were concentrated on contracts for finished vessels without improving production conditions at materials and component suppliers.

Indeed, even the shipyards that will assemble the warships must restore normal operations while investing in facilities. The holding company of Harland & Wolff, which is involved in the FSS program, entered administration in September 2024 after failing to secure working capital. In January last year, Navantia’s UK subsidiary acquired four of its shipyards, including Belfast. By then, plans for facility investment and capital injections needed to build the support ships had also been stalled for months. Navantia announced the resumption of investment immediately after the acquisition because it first needed to restore the production conditions required to fulfill the construction contract. Other naval shipbuilding programs have also faced design changes and production management pressures. Babcock, which is building five Type 31 frigates, recognized an additional USD 190 million loss this year after rework during the lead ship’s outfitting stage exceeded expectations. It also said some design modifications would be needed for the second ship.

Fleet Expansion Struggles Despite Higher Defense Spending

Production disruptions have also complicated fleet restructuring, as the retirement of aging vessels before new ships enter service has widened capability gaps. According to the House of Commons Defence Committee’s report, “Defence in the High North,” released on the 22nd of last month, the navy had five frigates and six destroyers, just 58% of its requirement for 19 ships. In particular, only five of the required eight frigates equipped with Sonar 2087 towed-array sonar for detecting submarines remained. The committee identified the retirement of aging Type 23 frigates, which could not remain in service through the lengthy construction schedule for new Type 26 frigates, as a major cause of the decline. In 2021, the then First Sea Lord expected the navy to restore its fleet to at least 19 frigates and destroyers by the end of this year, but its actual strength falls far short of that projection.

A shrinking fleet, compounded by maintenance delays and crew shortages, has also disrupted the operation of the remaining ships. In March, Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), assessed that an operating approach aimed at maximizing overseas deployments and operational activity by the aging fleet had accelerated breakdowns. He explained that Type 45 destroyers had spent lengthy periods in maintenance because initial defects were compounded by shortages of spare parts and technical personnel. The departure of experienced crew members has added to personnel retention pressures. A vicious cycle in which missions are concentrated on fewer ships, while breakdowns and maintenance further reduce available forces, is straining the navy’s ability to respond.

With pressures mounting both to expand capabilities and sustain the existing fleet, the effectiveness of the UK government’s planned defense spending increase is also being tested. The government plans to raise defense spending to 2.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in fiscal 2027–2028, but the eight new Type 26 frigates are scheduled to enter service in stages between 2028 and 2035. This means that even after the first ship arrives, the existing fleet will have to carry out anti-submarine surveillance and escort missions while waiting for the remaining vessels. Assigning more missions to existing ships already struggling with maintenance and personnel shortages risks increasing breakdowns and lengthening maintenance periods. Moreover, if disruptions to materials and component supplies delay new construction, additional funds will be needed to extend the service lives of aging vessels. As resources intended for capability expansion are consumed by maintaining the existing fleet, delays in restoring supply chains and expanding maintenance capacity will inevitably increase both the cost and the time required for rearmament.

Picture

Member for

2 years
Real name
Anne-Marie Nicholson
Bio
[email protected]

Anne-Marie Nicholson is a fearless reporter covering international markets and global economic shifts. With a background in international relations, she provides a nuanced perspective on trade policies, foreign investments, and macroeconomic developments. Quick-witted and always on the move, she delivers hard-hitting stories that connect the dots in an ever-changing global economy.

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