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“Iran Weighing ‘Dirty Bomb’ Attack on Washington”: Iran Remains Defiant Despite Leadership Killings, Exposing Trump's Miscalculation After Predicting Surrender

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1 year 11 months
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Matthew Reuter
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Matthew Reuter is a senior economic correspondent at The Economy, where he covers global financial markets, emerging technologies, and cross-border trade dynamics. With over a decade of experience reporting from major financial hubs—including London, New York, and Hong Kong—Matthew has developed a reputation for breaking complex economic stories into sharp, accessible narratives. Before joining The Economy, he worked at a leading European financial daily, where his investigative reporting on post-crisis banking reforms earned him recognition from the European Press Association. A graduate of the London School of Economics, Matthew holds dual degrees in economics and international relations. He is particularly interested in how data science and AI are reshaping market analysis and policymaking, often blending quantitative insights into his articles. Outside journalism, Matthew frequently moderates panels at global finance summits and guest lectures on financial journalism at top universities.

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U.S. fails to bring Iran to heel despite demands for unconditional surrender
In war's ninth month, intelligence on a Washington attack plot adds to homeland security burden
With nuclear facility inspections blocked, whereabouts of highly enriched uranium remain unknown

U.S. intelligence agencies have picked up intelligence that Iran, under pressure from U.S. military strikes and an economic blockade, is planning to detonate a radioactive dirty bomb or chemical weapons in Washington, D.C. The targets discussed were senior officials in the Donald Trump administration. Having demanded Iran's unconditional surrender at the outset of the war, the United States now finds itself having to prepare for threats of retaliation against its homeland in the conflict's ninth month. With inspections of nuclear facilities blocked since the airstrikes and the whereabouts of uranium unclear, Iran maintains that it will only attend talks to end the war if economic sanctions and the naval blockade are lifted first.

Washington Attack Plans Detected in Iranian Communications

According to CNN on the 17th (all dates hereafter are local time), U.S. intelligence agencies obtained intelligence that Iran had plotted an attack using a so-called dirty bomb or chemical weapons against senior Trump administration officials in Washington, D.C. Two of the seven U.S. officials interviewed by CNN said specific attack locations and targets had been discussed. However, officials familiar with the intelligence interpreted the discussions as Iran exploring possible responses as U.S. military strikes and the economic blockade continued. There is no evidence yet that Iran's leadership decided to carry out an attack, and officials differed in their assessments of whether Iran had personnel inside the United States capable of executing one.

What drew the attention of U.S. security authorities was that Iran had discussed Washington, D.C., as the setting for an attack. Iranian plots to assassinate current and former U.S. officials dating back to Trump's first administration often focused on their overseas trips, but this time, officials said, specific attack locations and targets within the U.S. capital were discussed. Iranian communications were also intercepted claiming that materials for making a bomb had already been hidden in the United States. U.S. security authorities held several meetings over the past week to discuss contingency plans for an attack in Washington. During the same period, the U.S. Secret Service moved Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's residence to military housing in response to threats from Iran.

A dirty bomb is a weapon that uses a conventional explosion to disperse radioactive material into the surrounding area. According to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), casualties immediately after detonation stem mainly from the blast itself, while substantial costs are incurred afterward in surveying contamination in buildings and roads and removing radioactive material. In particular, prolonged access restrictions in urban areas force residents to leave their homes and businesses to bear losses from suspended operations. In a 2024 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) suggested that a dirty bomb explosion in an urban area could cause tens of billions of USD in social and economic damage. Beyond the cost of cleaning up contaminated areas, losses could mount as business activity and public services are disrupted until infrastructure such as electricity and transportation returns to normal.

Table 1. Iran-Linked Incidents in the United States and Legal Responses

CategoryDateKey Details
Plot to Assassinate a Dissident JournalistMarch 2025A U.S. federal jury convicted 2 leaders of an Eastern European criminal organization of plotting to assassinate a dissident journalist in the United States at the Iranian government's request
Cyberattack on StrykerMarch 11, 2026Iran-linked hacking group Handala claimed the attack was retaliation for an airstrike on a girls' school in Minab. Network outages disrupted medical device order processing, production and shipments
U.S. Justice Department Domain SeizuresMarch 2026Seized 4 domains linked to Iranian intelligence ministry hacking activities, including sites operating under Handala's name. The Justice Department said the sites were used to claim responsibility for attacks and publish stolen data
Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Stryker

Threat of Retaliation Against U.S. Homeland Persists Despite Elimination of Iranian Leadership

Intelligence that Iran plotted a dirty bomb attack starkly illustrates the limitations of the Trump administration's military operations targeting Iran's leadership. The United States launched airstrikes on Iran in late February this year, killing then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and subsequently killed a succession of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. But Iran selected Khamenei's son Mojtaba as his successor in March, and the Revolutionary Guards continued wartime operations despite losing their commanders. Past assassination plots on U.S. soil even involved people outside the Iranian military's chain of command. In March last year, a U.S. federal jury convicted 2 leaders of an Eastern European criminal organization of plotting to assassinate a dissident journalist in the United States at the Iranian government's request. The trial revealed that their roles were to relay Iran's orders to kill the journalist to organization members in the United States and direct preparations for the crime.

Shortly after the United States struck Iran's military leadership, even private companies on U.S. soil became targets of retaliatory attacks. When U.S. medical device company Stryker's computer network came under cyberattack on March 11, the Iran-linked hacking group Handala claimed responsibility, saying it was retaliation for an airstrike on a girls' school in Minab, southern Iran. The consequences emerged in Stryker's announcement the following day. The company said network outages had disrupted its ability to process customer orders, as well as medical device production and shipments. Eight days after Handala claimed responsibility, the U.S. Justice Department seized 4 domains linked to Iranian intelligence ministry hacking activities, including sites operating under Handala's name. According to the department, the Iranian intelligence ministry had used these sites to claim responsibility for hacks and publish stolen data.

Whereabouts of Highly Enriched Uranium Remain Unclear

As threats of Iranian retaliation continue, inspections have yet to resume at Iranian nuclear facilities struck by U.S. airstrikes. Iran has made a “permanent end to the war” a condition for resuming inspections at the damaged facilities. In an interview with Iranian television on the 15th, Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors would be allowed access only after the war had ended completely and the United States had met Iran's demands. Inspectors checked the Bushehr nuclear power plant in September, but have not entered the Isfahan, Natanz or Fordow nuclear facilities even once since they were hit by airstrikes in June last year. This inspection gap also impedes efforts to establish the size of Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium held before the airstrikes. The IAEA estimated that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60% as of June 13 last year, but reportedly has been unable to verify where it is or how much actually remains since the strikes.

With the whereabouts of highly enriched uranium unclear and intelligence now emerging about a dirty bomb targeting Washington, the United States has a stronger rationale for prioritizing the management of Iran's nuclear material in negotiations to end the war. The Trump administration has already maintained that the nuclear issue must be on the agenda from the outset of negotiations. According to Israeli officials in May, President Trump's plan was also to include a provision in the agreement requiring Iran's highly enriched uranium to be removed from the country. Separately, the United States has begun gathering intelligence to establish the true state of the nuclear program. A State Department reward notice released by U.S. Central Command earlier this month offered up to USD 20 million for information on Iranian nuclear facilities, equipment and associated personnel.

Iran, however, reaffirmed its policy of keeping enriched nuclear material within the country, rejecting U.S. demands to transfer it abroad. In a letter to the United Nations and the IAEA on the 10th, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi argued that the rewards encouraged espionage targeting nuclear facilities and scientists, and called for safeguards against misuse of sensitive information obtained during inspections. Iran's leadership is also firm in opposing the transfer of enriched uranium abroad. In an interview with Lebanese broadcaster Al Mayadeen the following day, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, said that “not a single particle” of enriched nuclear material would be sent outside Iran. Rezaei said Iran had also told Russia, which had previously offered to take the uranium, that it intended to use the material itself. He cited the need for enriched uranium in designs for nuclear-powered ships and submarines as grounds for retaining it domestically.

Trump Retreats From Demands for ‘Unconditional Surrender’ to a Ceasefire

Iran's refusal to transfer enriched uranium abroad was foreshadowed by its rejection of U.S. demands for surrender shortly after the war began. In early March, President Trump said he had initially envisioned military operations against Iran lasting 4–5 weeks, and on the 6th he made “unconditional surrender” a condition for an agreement with Iran. The calculation was that if massive airstrikes crippled Iran's military capabilities, its leadership would accept U.S. terms for ending the war. But on the 8th of the same month, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian apologized for the damage suffered by neighboring Gulf states while dismissing the demand for surrender as something that could happen “only in your dreams.” Even so, on the 9th, President Trump raised the possibility that the war could end earlier than initially expected.

What the United States actually secured from Iran during that period was an April ceasefire agreement. According to congressional testimony by U.S. Central Command chief Brad Cooper, U.S. forces struck 13,500 targets in Iran between February 28, when the war began, and April 7. Despite unleashing that much firepower, the United States failed to include an obligation to transfer highly enriched uranium abroad in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the two countries' leaders two months later, on June 17. The minimum measure specified in the agreement was to reduce the uranium's enrichment level inside Iran under IAEA supervision. The final disposition of the enriched uranium already stockpiled and whether future uranium enrichment would be permitted were left to 60 days of follow-up negotiations. In effect, Iran secured a written commitment to halt U.S. military operations without promising to move its stockpile abroad.

Nuclear Talks at a Standstill Despite USD 38 Billion in War Spending

The two sides, however, failed to maintain the ceasefire for even half of the 60 days set aside to resolve the nuclear issue. On July 15, less than a month after the two countries' leaders agreed to permanently halt military operations on all fronts, U.S. forces resumed airstrikes on Iran on President Trump's orders. In late July, the strikes expanded to the Caspian Sea coast in northern Iran, and the MOU expired in August without a final agreement. The issues deferred in the nuclear negotiations remained unresolved, but the war costs borne by the United States had already swelled to tens of billions of USD. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the cost of operations against Iran through August 1 at USD 38 billion, including USD 10.4 billion attributable solely to increased military aircraft flight hours. Even that figure excluded the cost of repairing U.S. military bases in the Middle East damaged by Iranian attacks.

Nor did Iran soften its negotiating terms after the airstrikes resumed. Earlier this month, the ninth month of the war, Iran indicated it was willing to resume talks in as little as two days, but only if the United States first lifted economic sanctions and the naval blockade. Iran also demanded an end to fighting on all fronts. The pressure measures the United States had intended to use to extract nuclear concessions had instead become restrictions Iran demanded be removed as the price of entering negotiations. Even after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio rejected some of the conditions, Iran's Foreign Ministry maintained on the 9th that sanctions and the blockade must be lifted first. If the United States keeps sanctions in place, even the resumption of talks is uncertain; if it lifts them first, it must surrender negotiating leverage without securing a promise to transfer enriched uranium abroad. That is the reality facing the Trump administration in the ninth month of a war it began by demanding Iran's unconditional surrender.

Picture

Member for

1 year 11 months
Real name
Matthew Reuter
Bio
[email protected]

Matthew Reuter is a senior economic correspondent at The Economy, where he covers global financial markets, emerging technologies, and cross-border trade dynamics. With over a decade of experience reporting from major financial hubs—including London, New York, and Hong Kong—Matthew has developed a reputation for breaking complex economic stories into sharp, accessible narratives. Before joining The Economy, he worked at a leading European financial daily, where his investigative reporting on post-crisis banking reforms earned him recognition from the European Press Association. A graduate of the London School of Economics, Matthew holds dual degrees in economics and international relations. He is particularly interested in how data science and AI are reshaping market analysis and policymaking, often blending quantitative insights into his articles. Outside journalism, Matthew frequently moderates panels at global finance summits and guest lectures on financial journalism at top universities.

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