“Buy American Weapons”: Europe’s Defense Autonomy Faces U.S. Pressure, With Critical Capability Gaps and Nuclear Deterrence Constraints Exposed

“Do You Support Procuring European-Made Weapons?” U.S. Pressures NATO Allies
EU Moves to Build an Independent Defense Ecosystem, but Prospects of Escaping Washington’s Shadow Remain Uncertain
France and Britain Bolster Nuclear Deterrence, Exposing the Limits of an “Eye for an Eye” Strategy

The administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has stepped up pressure on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies over their defense posture. Washington distributed a questionnaire asking member states whether they support U.S. foreign policy and how much American-made weaponry they procure, signaling its displeasure with Europe’s push for defense autonomy. Experts, however, believe Europe’s independent defense plans will struggle to advance, despite Washington’s concerns. Europe remains heavily dependent on the United States for critical capabilities including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, long-range strike systems, missile defense and nuclear deterrence, making the rapid establishment of a defense architecture free from U.S. support virtually unattainable.

U.S. Distributes Questionnaire to Allies

Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported on Aug. 16, citing documents obtained by Bloomberg, that the U.S. government had sent assessment questionnaires to NATO allies to evaluate each country’s political alignment as Washington considers adjustments to its military deployments across the alliance. The United States previously formalized plans to relocate 5,000 troops stationed in Germany to other regions without deploying replacement forces. The review covers ground troops as well as critical wartime assets such as strategic bombers, strike drones and warships. Poland, meanwhile, secured a pledge for additional U.S. troop deployments following Karol Nawrocki’s election as president. The contrast demonstrated that Washington’s treatment of individual member states could diverge sharply.

The questionnaire specifically asked whether allies had supported U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East and Western Hemisphere. The assessment criteria included cooperation with Washington’s previous unilateral military strikes against Iran and pressure campaign against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s government. Allies were also asked about their willingness to permit the use of U.S. military bases. The question targeted NATO members such as Spain, which denied access to U.S. bases on its territory during earlier unilateral American military operations, asking whether they intended to reduce or abolish such restrictions. Washington also sought confirmation that allies purchase weapons from American companies and asked whether they had opposed “Made in Europe” procurement rules that restrict contracts with U.S. defense contractors.

EU’s Blueprint for Stronger Defense Autonomy

The “Made in Europe” procurement rules cited by Washington broadly refer to policies recently promoted by the European Union (EU) to expand production among European defense manufacturers. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen publicly stated when unveiling the bloc’s defense strategy last year that Europe must “not only spend more on defense, but also buy more European weapons.” The Commission has also set a political target of sourcing at least 55% of member states’ defense investment from the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) by 2030.

The EU introduced these policies to prevent the economic gains generated by higher defense spending among member states from flowing to U.S. arms manufacturers. EU countries have sharply increased military expenditure since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but a substantial share has funded imports of American weaponry, leaving Europe’s defense industry with limited benefits. Calls have consequently intensified across the bloc to reduce dependence on U.S. weapons, components, maintenance services and software while expanding indigenous production capacity.

NATO’s Shift Away From U.S. Defense Systems Takes Shape

Efforts to reduce reliance on the U.S.-centered defense procurement system have emerged across multiple sectors. In April, Italy’s Directorate of Aeronautical Armaments and Airworthiness (ARMAERO) signed a definitive contract with European aerospace manufacturer Airbus for six A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft. The contract is worth approximately $1.61 billion, including long-term integrated logistics support (ILS). The Airbus aircraft will replace the U.S.-made Boeing KC-767 tankers that Italy has operated for 15 years. The Italian Air Force initially pursued Boeing’s KC-46 Pegasus from 2022, but halted the process in 2024 and shifted to an open tender, which Airbus subsequently won.

A similar shift has emerged in NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) program. The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) initially pursued the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail as a replacement for the E-3 Sentry, but the plan encountered setbacks after the U.S. Air Force began considering withdrawal from the E-7 program. Swedish defense manufacturer Saab moved to capitalize on the opening. NATO is now reportedly considering Saab’s GlobalEye as a leading candidate for its next-generation airborne early-warning platform. Member states are also pursuing independent sixth-generation fighter programs, represented by the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) led by France, Germany and Spain and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) involving Britain, Italy and Japan. The FCAS partnership has recently undergone a rapid realignment, however, with Germany withdrawing and India exploring possible participation.

Table 1. NATO’s Moves Away From U.S. Defense Systems

Pessimism Mounts Across the Alliance

Senior officials from NATO countries outside the United States lack clear confidence in Europe’s capacity for autonomous defense. Appearing before the European Parliament in January, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said, “If anyone here thinks that the EU or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the United States, that is only a dream. It cannot.” Rutte argued that building an independent European nuclear capability would cost billions of dollars and require defense spending equivalent to 10% of gross domestic product (GDP). “Under that scenario, we would lose the ultimate guarantor of our freedom—the U.S. nuclear umbrella,” he said.

Research institutions have offered similar assessments. Germany’s Kiel Institute for the World Economy estimated that the EU would need to spend an additional $289.3 billion annually to reduce its defense dependence on the United States. NATO’s origins as a U.S.-led alliance also constitute a formidable barrier. Reconfiguring the current NATO architecture under independent European leadership would likely require enormous financial resources and considerable time. Ivo Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, wrote in a research report published by Harvard University’s Belfer Center that “a strong European security order requires not only money, personnel and time, but also cooperation with the United States.” He added, “The U.S. military is NATO’s skeleton. If the skeleton is suddenly removed, the body—Europe—dies.”

The Reality of Europe’s Defense Architecture

Europe remains heavily dependent on the United States across critical areas including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), military satellites, long-range precision strike capabilities and missile defense. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the United States operates at least 80 crewed ISR aircraft, compared with approximately 36 in Europe. The disparity is similarly pronounced in signals-intelligence aircraft, with the United States operating 34 and Europe 11. U.S. corporate technology is also deeply embedded in the digital infrastructure of European armed forces, including intelligence satellites, command-and-control systems, cloud services, communications and data analytics. Even European-built warships carry critical American systems, including the Aegis Combat System used by the Norwegian and Spanish navies.

Any weakening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella would introduce another major variable. France and Britain are the only European countries that possess their own nuclear weapons. France, which maintains an independent nuclear force free from U.S. technology, is widely regarded as the most viable candidate to fill the strategic vacuum left by Washington. French President Emmanuel Macron has already initiated strategic discussions on linking France’s nuclear deterrent with European allies. This year, he also proposed a “forward deterrence” framework aimed at strengthening nuclear cooperation with Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark and other European countries. Under the proposal, the French president would retain exclusive authority over the final use of France’s nuclear arsenal, while allies would contribute to nuclear exercises, early-warning capabilities and conventional support. Nuclear cooperation between France and Britain is also becoming increasingly explicit. Through last year’s Northwood Declaration, the two countries agreed for the first time to formally coordinate their independent nuclear deterrents and made clear that both arsenals could be brought into consideration simultaneously if Europe faced an extreme threat.

Can Nuclear Weapons Be Countered With More Nuclear Weapons?

Britain’s nuclear force is not fully independent of the United States. Although Britain operates its own nuclear warheads and ballistic-missile submarines, it relies on the United States for the technology and maintenance underpinning its submarine-launched Trident ballistic missiles. The disparity in scale is equally pronounced. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated in January that France and Britain possess 290 and 225 nuclear warheads, respectively. Those stockpiles remain far below the military inventories of the United States, with 3,700 warheads, and Russia, with 4,400. The United States currently has 1,770 nuclear warheads deployed with operational forces, while Russia has deployed 1,796.

Europe’s efforts to strengthen its independent nuclear capabilities could also heighten instability across the international community. An expansion of European nuclear forces to counter Russia could provide other countries with grounds to accelerate their own nuclear armament, fueling a destabilizing cycle. A foreign-policy expert said, “Countering nuclear weapons solely with nuclear weapons does not provide the only solution. Nuclear deterrence serves as the final safeguard, while sufficient conventional capabilities and robust air and missile defense systems remain essential to preventing an adversary from launching military action.” The expert added, “If countries begin expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to nuclear threats, the broader security environment could become even more unstable.”