Xi Tightens Control Over Military and Rebuilds Forces as Prospects of a 2027 Taiwan Invasion Recede

Purges of Military Leaders and Shortfalls in Transport and Logistics Capacity
Setbacks in Preparations to Occupy Taiwan Weaken the Case for a 2027 Invasion
Growing Prospects of Military Reorganization and Sustained Pressure

Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the military to complete preparations by 2027 to seize Taiwan by force if necessary, but the likelihood of a Chinese invasion before 2028 is increasingly seen as receding. That assessment reflects gaps in the chain of command caused by successive purges of senior military leaders, alongside insufficient transport and logistics capacity to land a large force and sustain an occupation. Some analysts also argue that Xi has chosen a long-term strategy of tightening his control over the military while maintaining pressure on Taiwan. With Taiwan’s presidential election and the U.S. presidential election both scheduled for 2028, there is also speculation that Beijing could assess cross-strait relations and Washington’s willingness to intervene before deciding whether to use force.

U.S. Assessment: Invasion of Taiwan Next Year Unlikely

Reuters reported on October 1, with all dates hereafter referring to local time, that U.S. officials increasingly view a Chinese invasion of Taiwan next year as unlikely, contrary to their earlier expectations. According to the report, Xi has repeatedly expressed his willingness to unify Taiwan with China by force if necessary and has reviewed the military’s capabilities. For years, U.S. officials have assessed that Xi wants the military to be ready to seize Taiwan by force by 2027, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

The central basis for the “2027 Taiwan invasion” scenario was the readiness deadline Xi set for the military. In February 2023, then-Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns disclosed, citing intelligence assessments, that Xi had instructed the PLA to be ready to carry out an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. The directive called for the military to acquire the capabilities needed to pursue unification by force, if necessary, by the PLA’s centenary. Earlier, in March 2021, then-U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief Philip Davidson warned at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that China’s threat to Taiwan could materialize within the next six years. He cited the pace at which China was deploying large numbers of ships, aircraft and missiles while improving its ability to operate them. Underlying that assessment was the view that China was accelerating its efforts to displace the United States as the dominant regional power and could seek to seize Taiwan in the process.

The U.S. military subsequently continued to assess that China could be ready for an invasion by 2027, citing the scale of its military buildup and the pattern of its exercises around Taiwan. In March 2024, then-U.S. Indo-Pacific Command chief John Aquilino told the House Armed Services Committee that the Chinese military was moving toward fulfilling Xi’s readiness directive. According to the figures he presented, China had added more than 400 fighter aircraft and more than 20 major warships in roughly three years since he took command. Its inventories of ballistic and cruise missiles had also doubled over the same period. Aquilino further noted that the Chinese military was repeatedly rehearsing operations against Taiwan. The exercises included maritime and air blockades, while drills in April 2023 simulated encircling Taiwan and striking targets.

Military Readiness Delays Following the Anti-Corruption Campaign

Recently, however, U.S. officials have begun to assess that the Chinese military may struggle to complete its invasion preparations within the timeframe originally anticipated. Their assessment that an invasion before 2028 is unlikely stems from the sweeping anti-corruption and disciplinary campaign Xi has led since taking power in 2012. Investigations targeting the military have focused on misconduct in senior officers’ personnel decisions and bribery in weapons procurement. Early in Xi’s tenure, former Central Military Commission vice chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong came under investigation in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Both were leading military figures during Hu Jintao’s administration and were accused of accepting substantial bribes in exchange for helping officers secure promotions and postings.

The investigations subsequently extended to military equipment procurement, and in 2023 both the commander and the political commissar of the Rocket Force, which oversees nuclear and conventional missiles, were replaced. In June the following year, former defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were both expelled from the Communist Party and referred to military prosecutors. The charges disclosed by Chinese authorities at the time included accepting substantial bribes and granting preferential treatment in personnel decisions. Li was also accused of giving money and valuables to others to advance his own interests.

More recently, even senior military leaders close to Xi have become targets of the purge, bringing more stringent scrutiny of political loyalty. In January this year, authorities announced investigations into Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli, and both were stripped of their party membership and military status last month. Zhang, in particular, had been regarded as one of Xi’s closest confidants and a powerful military figure, with combat experience from the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Chinese authorities cited disloyalty to the party, faction-building and dereliction of duty, alongside the acceptance of substantial bribes, as grounds for their expulsion. The announcement also included accusations of improper interference in personnel decisions, including using their positions to help others obtain promotions.

As the investigations into China’s vast bureaucracy have recently reached the military’s inner circle, they have severely disrupted the PLA’s efforts to improve its military readiness. Following the recent wave of intensive investigations and removals, only two serving senior officials besides Xi remain on the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military command body, which previously had seven members. The Joint Staff Department led by Liu is responsible for operational planning and command, meaning the latest purge has also affected the leadership overseeing preparations for war. Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), assessed that these vacancies could constrain the Chinese military’s preparations for a major conflict in the near term. Successive changes at the top of the military could therefore also weigh on the invasion readiness timetable.

Table 1. Chinese Military Capabilities and Constraints in Landing on and Occupying Taiwan

Obstacles From the Outset in Deploying a Large Force

Another reason the 2027 invasion scenario has lost ground is the limited transport and logistics capacity needed to land a large force on Taiwan and sustain an occupation. Based on interviews with U.S. and Taiwanese military experts last November, Reuters estimated that the Chinese military could transport approximately 20,000 troops using military vessels alone during an initial assault. Estimates of the force required to subdue Taiwan ranged from 300,000 to more than 1 million troops, depending on the assumptions underlying the operation. To meet those transport requirements, the Chinese military has expanded exercises involving civilian passenger ferries and cargo ships. Last August, six vehicle carriers and six deck cargo ships assembled off the coast of Guangdong province, and satellite imagery captured some vessels using ramps to unload vehicles directly onto beaches. The activity was interpreted as an effort to establish ways to continue deploying troops and equipment if ports could not be secured or their facilities were destroyed.

After a landing, securing supply routes for the continued delivery of follow-on troops, ammunition and fuel would remain a major challenge. If ports and unloading facilities could not be seized promptly, large volumes of supplies would have to be moved directly onto beaches, exposing transport vessels and unloading equipment to Taiwanese attacks. Taiwanese defense officials have warned, in particular, that the civilian vessels mobilized to supplement China’s military transport capacity could be vulnerable even to small weapons such as man-portable missiles. If U.S. forces also intervened, the Chinese military would face the burden of protecting transport convoys crossing the strait while simultaneously supporting ground combat by its forces on Taiwan.

Resupply Disruptions in War Games, Readiness Shortfalls in Actual Exercises

War games have also indicated that resistance by Taiwanese forces with external support could thwart an invasion. In the 24 war games published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2023, the Chinese military failed to occupy Taiwan in many scenarios involving responses by the United States, Taiwan and Japan. In a report released this March, U.S. intelligence authorities likewise assessed that China’s capabilities to seize Taiwan were steadily improving, but readiness remained uneven across different areas. These limitations also emerged in the CSIS war games as Chinese forces attempted to sustain their offensive after landing. Mounting losses of maritime transport assets prevented the timely deployment of follow-on troops and supplies, leaving forces that had reached Taiwan facing supply shortages and the risk of isolation. The analysis indicated that even a successful initial landing would not ensure the sustained delivery of the forces and resources needed to expand and hold occupied territory.

Assessments of actual exercises also suggest that preparations for an invasion remain inadequate. According to a senior U.S. official, the scale of Chinese military exercises last year declined noticeably compared with previous years, and the threat they posed also diminished. Although exercises have partially recovered this year, even China’s military leadership is reportedly dissatisfied with the current state of readiness. In particular, China’s leaders have drawn painful lessons from the wars in Iran and Ukraine: failure to secure a swift victory after launching an invasion can leave an attacker mired in a prolonged conflict. They recognize that the ability to achieve a rapid, decisive outcome is essential, but military preparations to support it remain woefully inadequate. One U.S. official said: “A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be the most difficult military operation attempted by a modern military since the Normandy landings, and far too many pieces are still missing.”

Military Buildup and Close Attention to Political Conditions

With time still needed to develop the capabilities required for an invasion, some analysts argue that Xi is consolidating his control over the military while waiting for conditions more favorable to unification. In May, the French newspaper Le Monde gave weight to the view that the purges of senior military leaders reflected Xi’s efforts to reorganize China’s armed forces over the long term. According to that interpretation, China’s leadership expects conditions for unification with Taiwan to improve over time as it monitors the expansion of its military power and the burdens on U.S. foreign policy. In a Foreign Affairs article published in May, Eurasia Group director Amanda Hsiao and Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, similarly explained that China’s leadership believes it can reduce the costs of unification over time. Its calculation is that accumulating military and economic power could deter U.S. intervention and extract concessions from Taiwan. The two experts also argued that Beijing’s confidence in its ability to prevent Taiwan from pursuing formal independence supports this long-term strategy.

Those expectations also encompass the possibility that Taiwan’s 2028 presidential election could produce political conditions more favorable to unification. Citing current and former U.S. officials and other sources, Reuters reported that some Chinese leaders hope for a government more willing to cooperate in bringing Taiwan under Chinese control. Their calculation is that a change of government could create greater scope for cross-strait negotiations and reduce the costs associated with the use of force. U.S. sources have raised the possibility that China could consider military action more seriously after 2028 if the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) secures a fourth consecutive term in power. The U.S. presidential election in 2028 is also cited as a factor that could influence Beijing’s judgment. Three sources interviewed by Reuters said China might wait to assess the U.S. election outcome, taking into account growing opposition among American voters to overseas military intervention. Beijing could weigh whether the next administration would have both the willingness and the domestic political support to intervene militarily in Taiwan’s defense.