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“Reduce Dependence on Chinese Equipment”: US and EU Tighten Digital Infrastructure Security Rules, Move to Control Supply Chains After Repeated Hacks

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US pursues ban on Chinese-made optical transceiver imports despite Big Tech opposition
EU also moves to control ICT supply chains, increasing pressure to remove high-risk equipment
Mounting damage from China-linked hacking groups raises security concerns over critical infrastructure

US President Donald Trump's administration is pursuing restrictions on imports of key Chinese-made data center equipment. With Chinese companies controlling a substantial share of the global optical transceiver market, national security concerns have grown that Chinese-made equipment could be exploited as a conduit for cyberattacks, including data theft and malware distribution. The European Union (EU) is also stepping up efforts to counter China's role in digital infrastructure by reducing dependence on high-risk suppliers such as Huawei and ZTE and tightening security rules across information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains.

US Pursues Restrictions on Chinese-Made Optical Transceiver Imports

On the 17th (local time), Reuters, citing multiple sources, reported that “the Trump administration is continuing to pursue measures to restrict imports of Chinese-made optical transceivers on national security grounds.” Optical transceivers are essential components used in data centers to send and receive large volumes of data at high speeds over fiber-optic cables. Chinese companies, including Eoptolink and Zhongji Innolight, account for about two-thirds of the market. China hawks in the US government have expressed concerns that Chinese authorities could use Chinese-made optical transceivers to steal information from US data centers or install malware to disrupt their operations. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is also pursuing a ban on imports of new Chinese-made optical transceiver products.

The US technology industry is strongly opposing these government moves. Reuters reported that “Amazon, Google, Meta, CoreWeave and Cisco, along with Microsoft executives, met with White House officials to explain the burdens the restrictions would impose,” adding that “they argued it could take up to 10 years to replace Chinese-made equipment with alternatives and shift their supply chains.” The companies reportedly also raised the possibility that China could retaliate by banning exports of indium phosphide, a key material needed to manufacture optical transceivers. Sources noted that this industry opposition had cast doubt on whether the import ban would actually be implemented, but had not stopped the policy from moving forward.

EU Also Scrutinizes Telecommunications and Digital Infrastructure Supply Chains

Wariness of Chinese-made equipment extends beyond the United States to other parts of the West. In June 2023, for example, the European Commission designated China's Huawei and ZTE as high-risk suppliers for fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks. The decision was based on the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox introduced in 2020. The toolbox provides policy guidelines for EU member states to jointly assess and address security risks to 5G networks. It recommends excluding equipment from companies posing high security risks from critical 5G infrastructure and network management systems, while reducing dependence on individual suppliers.

This year, measures are also being pursued to expand security regulation beyond individual telecommunications devices to entire information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains. In January, the European Commission proposed amendments to the Cybersecurity Act, establishing a basis for joint risk assessments of ICT supply chains in 18 critical sectors, including energy, transport and health, and for restricting high-risk suppliers' access to those supply chains. In February, a cooperation body comprising EU member states, the European Commission and the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) also released an ICT Supply Chain Security Toolbox, recommending security risk assessments of major suppliers, the use of multiple suppliers and reduced dependence on high-risk companies.

Tighter Security, Vulnerability and Certification Requirements for Digital Products

Security obligations for digital products themselves are also expanding. Under the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), which entered into force in December 2024, the EU plans to apply stricter cybersecurity requirements to digital hardware and software placed on its market from December 11, 2027. Covered products include network equipment such as routers and firewalls, industrial controllers, operating systems, antivirus software, smart home devices, and separately sold software and hardware components. Manufacturers must assess cybersecurity risks during product design, development and production, and release products without security vulnerabilities known to be exploitable. They must also maintain inventories of software components and external libraries used in their products, and develop and distribute security patches when vulnerabilities are discovered.

Conformity assessment procedures also vary by risk level. Critical products such as smart cards, security chips and smart meter gateways generally require assessment by an external certification body. Manufacturers must document the assessment results and security risk analyses in technical documentation, issue an EU declaration of conformity and affix the CE conformity marking to their products. Reporting obligations for significant incidents affecting product security took effect first, in September. Manufacturers must submit an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of the relevant facts, followed within 72 hours by an additional notification detailing the vulnerability or incident and response measures. A final report must then be submitted within 14 days of a corrective measure becoming available for a vulnerability, or within one month of the 72-hour notification for a significant incident.

Table 1. US and EU Measures to Strengthen Telecommunications and Digital Supply Chain Security

CountryRegulatory AreaKey Measures
United StatesOptical transceiversPursuing a ban on imports of new Chinese-made products
EU5G networksDesignating Huawei and ZTE as high-risk suppliers and recommending the exclusion of their equipment from critical infrastructure and network management systems
ICT supply chainsProposing amendments to the Cybersecurity Act and recommending supplier diversification and reduced dependence on high-risk companies
Digital productsRequiring security risk assessments, vulnerability management and reporting, and security patches under the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA)
Sources: Reuters, European Commission, EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)

Data Center Security Threats Come Into Focus

Western countries are tightening security rules for telecommunications and digital infrastructure because of repeated cyberattacks targeting communications networks and critical infrastructure in major countries. A prominent example is the infiltration of US telecommunications networks by Salt Typhoon, a hacking group believed to be backed by the Chinese government. In 2024, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) announced that China-linked hackers had infiltrated the networks of major US telecommunications operators, stealing customer call records and the communications of some government and political figures. Affected companies included AT&T and Verizon, while prominent politicians, including then-Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump, were identified as targets. Investigators found that the attackers had exploited vulnerabilities in network equipment such as routers to gain administrator privileges and maintained long-term access to internal networks through legitimate system administration functions.

Connections between data centers and telecommunications networks were also identified as a security vulnerability. In August, the US House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party pointed out that major telecommunications operators had arrangements that indirectly connected them to Chinese telecommunications companies' equipment and facilities in the course of operating data centers and related infrastructure. This meant Chinese companies barred from providing telecommunications services in the United States could potentially access US telecommunications networks through data center equipment supply and technical support. The committee also raised the possibility that these connections had been exploited in Salt Typhoon's 2024 infiltration of US telecommunications networks.

Repeated Hacks Target Critical Infrastructure in the West

Cases of intrusions directly targeting critical infrastructure have also accumulated. In February 2024, the FBI, the US National Security Agency (NSA) and CISA announced that Volt Typhoon, a Chinese government-backed hacking group, had infiltrated internal networks at telecommunications, energy, transportation, water and wastewater facilities in the continental United States, Guam and elsewhere. The attackers infected hundreds of routers from Cisco, Netgear and other manufacturers that no longer received security support, using them as staging points for attacks. At some water facilities, they were confirmed to have accessed internal servers using stolen administrator accounts. In February this year, Cisco's security research unit Talos also disclosed that a hacking group of unknown origin, UAT-8616, had gained administrator privileges through vulnerabilities in its software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) management equipment. Subsequent investigations uncovered indications that the attacks had been ongoing since at least 2023.

China-linked hacking groups have also infiltrated government networks in Europe. In February 2024, the Netherlands' Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) said that “a Chinese government-backed hacking group infiltrated a Dutch Ministry of Defence research and development network in 2023.” The attackers exploited a vulnerability in FortiGate firewall equipment made by US company Fortinet to penetrate the internal network, installed remote-access malware called COATHANGER and exfiltrated user account information. A similar incident occurred in the United Kingdom. Between August 2021 and October 2022, an outside attacker accessed the UK Electoral Commission's internal servers and compromised a system containing the personal information of approximately 40 million people. The attack exploited vulnerabilities including those in Microsoft Exchange Server, and in March 2024 the UK government formally attributed the incident to hacking activity linked to the Chinese government.

Picture

Member for

2 years
Real name
Tyler Hansbrough
Bio
[email protected]

As one of the youngest members of the team, Tyler Hansbrough is a rising star in financial journalism. His fresh perspective and analytical approach bring a modern edge to business reporting. Whether he’s covering stock market trends or dissecting corporate earnings, his sharp insights resonate with the new generation of investors.

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